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The Florida Constitution of 1968 treats constitutional amendment
as a likely regular happening and as a power of government properly
widely distributed. Amendment opportunities, however difficult to pursue, are made available to the Florida Legislature and to constitutional
conventions, to the public at large through the initiative process, and (at
designated intervals) to two sorts of commissions to be assembled in
more or less nonpartisan ways charged with addressing either fiscal matters or all other aspects of the constitutional scheme.' Sometimes drawing on particular constitutional terms and sometimes not, the Florida
Supreme Court has propounded three lines of thought further organizing
the Constitution's amendment processes. I have discussed elsewhere, at
much length, one of these efforts-the remarkable single subject
* Professor, University of Miami School of Law.

I. FLA. CONST. art. XI, §§ 1 (legislative proposal), 4 (constitutional convention), 3
(initiative), 6 (taxation and budget reform commission), 2 (revision commission).
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sequence monitoring the content of initiative-proposed amendments. 2 In
this article I consider the other two judicial elaborations-distinguishing
between self-executing and not self-executing constitutional provisions,
and requiring that ballot summaries of proposed amendments pass sub-

stantial accuracy tests.
Critics sometimes disparage these bodies of (mostly) judge-made
law. 3 I argue, in contrast, that the three lines of thought fit well together.
Their substance and purpose is well-explained not as an effort to address
vagaries of legislative and electoral decision-making, but as instead
responding to the underlying complexities of constitutional organization
confronting all interpreters. 4 In this regard, I develop a line of thinking
that diverges considerably from much writing concerned with problems
posed by initiatives and other forms of direct democracy. Many com-

mentators analyze constitutional amendment processes originating in
initiative petitions by making a comparison with legislative processes.
Robert Williams states succinctly the conclusion that usually follows:
"[T]he initiative lacks the possibility of deliberation."5 Judicial intervention or other forms of regulation or reform are depicted and assessed as
possible ways of bringing more of the virtues of representative democracy into the mechanics of direct democracy. But there is an immediate
difficulty. Legislatures and the election regimes that select representatives suffer from their own disorders, we all know, and are themselves
subject to familiar and persuasive critiques. The comparison-if set up
as between flawed initiative processes and flawed legislative
processes-not surprisingly loses much of its grip. For this reason, in
this article I generally sidestep the "deliberative democracy" difficulty. I
2. Patrick 0. Gudridge, Florida ConstitutionalTheory (For Clifford Alloway), 48 U. MIAMI

L.

REV.

809 (1994).

3. See, e.g., Eric S. Matthew, A New Prescription: How a Thorough Diagnosis of the
"Medical Malpractice" Amendments Reveals Potential Cures for Florida's Ailing Citizen
Initiative Process, 14 U. MIAMI. Bus. L. REV. 331, 342-46 (2006); Thomas Rutherford, The
People Drunk or the People Sober? Direct Democracy Meets the Supreme Court of Florida, 15
ST. THOMAS L. REv. 61 (2002); Thomas C. Marks, Jr., Constitutional Change Initiated by the
People: One State's Unhappy Experience, 68 TEMP. L. REV. 1241 (1995). The overall
constitutional structure itself is also criticized. In this regard, Professor Little's explorations are
particularly pointed and challenging. See, e.g., Joseph W. Little, The Need to Revise the Florida
Constitutional Revision Commission, 52 FLA L. REV. 475, 475-81 (2000) [hereinafter cited as
Little, Need to Revise]; Joseph W. Little, Does Direct Democracy Threaten Constitutional
Governance in Florida?, 24 STETSON L. REv. 393, 398-405 (1995) [hereinafter cited as Little,
Direct Democracy].
4. I do not discuss initiative single subject law at any length. But I do summarize my
approach to the topic in the appendix to this article. See infra Appendix.

5.

ROBERT F. WILLIAMS, THE LAW OF AMERICAN STATE CoNsTrruTIONs

389 (2009). For an

excellent recent articulation and application of the idea of deliberation in the direct democracy
setting, see Note, Making Ballot Initiatives Work: Some Assembly Required, 123 HARV. L. REV.
959 (2010).
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focus on the results of initiatives-constitutional provisions-and take
up the problems posed by these provisions as constitutional law, as
problems of installation and interpretation within the larger body of constitutional provisions and understandings. This change in perspective is
in one sense radical. I need to proceed on the assumption that we can
equate (in some useful way) all readers of constitutional provisionsvoters, judges, legislators, etc. I wager, however, that this equation
opens up analysis to resources not so readily available within the usual
perspective.
In the first two parts of this article, I summarize the efforts of Florida judges to identify self-executing constitutional provisions, and to
ascertain the accuracy of ballot summaries. I work mostly with formulations that the opinions themselves use-considered as useful explanations, these efforts call attention to difficulties as much or more as they
persuade. The third part of the article sketches beginnings of an alternate
approach. I outline three states of constitutional organization-straightforward, chaotic, and complex. In the fourth part of the article, I put to
work the idea of complex constitutional organization as a point of departure for reconsidering the "self-executing" inquiry and the misleading
language problem. Finally, in part five I discuss two important premises
underlying the preceding analysis.
This is not a short article. Florida constitutional law, across its long
duration, is quite thick, a rich, agglomerative medium manifestly inviting intense investigations of alternative approaches. I try to take advantage of some of this available wealth in the course of the discussions
here.
I.

THE ENIGMA OF GRAY V. BRYANT

Amendments, some worry, are constitutional equivalents of graffiti.
They are mostly the work of legislators or initiative-sponsoring volunteers from the public at large, 6 both groups that may too often resemble
too closely randomly selected exponents of points of view changing
from amendment to amendment. Sometimes quixotic, overly simple, or
conspicuously special interest-motivated constitutional changes resultor so the worry runs.7 Constitutional amendments, in any event, risk
creating conflicts with provisions already part of the constitution that
6. The revision and the taxation and budget commissions are ad hoc in the sense that
commissioners are appointed and meet only for the purpose of proposing amendments at a
particular point in time, but the appointment procedures are constitutionally structured and the
commissions are required to follow procedures constitutionally outlined. See FLA. CONST. art. XI,
§§ 2, 6.
7. Criticisms like these are not specific to Florida constitutional revision procedures. See,
e.g., DENNIs F. THOMPSON, JUST ELECTIONS 138-39 (2002); Glen Staszewski, The Bait-and-
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were not directly enough removed by amendment terms. 8 It is not only
the Florida constitution that proposed amendments might alter or otherwise complicate. If they are understood to be self-executing, and thus
directly revise public or private rights and duties, constitutional amendments may substantially change statutory or common law liability rules
or property regimes.
Amendments that are not self-executing are obviously safer. Constitutional changes that do not take effect until after legislative enactment of implementing measures offer a chance for any necessary cleanup work or other adjustments, or (what might sometimes seem to be
best) benign neglect.9 But the need for legislative enactment may also
stall worthwhile constitutional reforms if legislators are recalcitrant. 10
Whether or not amendments are self-executing is thus a question of real
moment. 1" Some constitutional provisions-whether original or additions-are plainly written in terms that suppose that constitutional terms
are directly applicable. They can be taken into account immediately by
legislators, judges, and administrators without need for any intervening
explanatory gloss. The constitutional homestead exemption protecting
debtors and the constitutionally imposed obligation of government officials to make public most government meetings and records are important examples. 12 But there are also hard cases. Unfortunately, the Florida
Supreme Court's long-time test for identifying self-executing constitutional language, declared in Gray v. Bryant,13 is notably enigmatic (or so
it seems)-"whether or not the provision lays down a sufficient rule by
means of which the right or purpose which it gives or is intended to
accomplish may be determined, enjoyed, or protected without the aid of
legislative enactment."' 4 What makes a rule "sufficient?" The Supreme
Switch in Direct Democracy, 2006 Wis. L. REV. 17, 32-39; Sherman J. Clark, Commentary, A
Populist Critique of Direct Democracy, 112 HARV. L. REV. 434, 448-50 (1998).
8. See Gudridge, supra note 2, at 818-29, 899-901.
9. Concerning legislative "second looks," see GuIDo CALABRESI, A COMMON LAW FOR THE
AGE OF STATUTES (1982).

10. See Dade County Classroom Teachers Ass'n v. Legislature, 269 So. 2d 684, 688 (Fla.
1972) (legislative failure to implement article I, § 6 (right of public employees to bargain
collectively)).
11.Of course, if drafters of constitutional amendments can resolve the question of selfexecution simply by labeling amendments, the significance of the question would diminish. The
Florida Supreme Court, it appears, does not treat declarations of direct effect as definitive-rather,

as one element in an independent judicial analysis, as confirming rather than decisive. See Fla.
Hosp. Waterman, Inc. v. Buster, 984 So. 2d 478, 485-86 (Fla. 2008).
12. See FLA. CONST. art. X, § 4 (homestead); id. at art. I, § 24 (public access). The public
access provision declares itself to be self-executing, but also authorizes legislative exceptions and

administrative measures. See id.
13. 125 So. 2d 846 (Fla. 1960) (per curiam).
14. Id. at 851.

2010]

COMPLEXITY AND CONTRADICTION

Court has appeared not to want-at least in so many words-to answer
this question.
The Court's analysis of the 1996 "polluter pays" amendment-an
initiative effort-is illustrative.1 5 The amendment declared that individuals or entities that "cause water pollution" within the Everglades area
"shall be primarily responsible for paying the costs of the abatement of
that pollution."' 6 A Supreme Court advisory opinion, requested by Governor Chiles, concluded that the amendment was not self-executing. 7 It

"raises a number of questions," too many to be understood as stating "a
sufficient rule for accomplishing its purpose."' 8 This was not to say, the
Court also observed, that the amendment was entirely judicially incomprehensible. It could not be read as effectuated in advance, as it were, by
the already-in-place Everglades Forever Act.' 9 Future implementing legislation would have to respect the amendment's assignment of primary
responsibility. Governor Chiles appears to have thought that the defini-

tion of "primary responsibility" was one of the amendment's great open
questions.20 But the Supreme Court saw no special difficulty in defining
this seemingly question-begging phrase. After a quick march through the
dictionaries, 2 the Court concluded that "individual polluters, while not
bearing the total burden, would bear their share of the costs of abating
the pollution found to be attributable to them."22
15. In re 1996 Amendment 5 (Everglades), 706 So. 2d 278, 280-82 (Fla. 1997).
16. The amendment added part (b) to article II, section 7, of the Florida Constitution:
(a) It shall be the policy of the state to conserve and protect its natural
resources and scenic beauty. Adequate provision shall be made by law for the
abatement of air and water pollution and of excessive and unnecessary noise ....
(b) Those in the Everglades Agricultural Area who cause water pollution
within the Everglades Protection Area or the Everglades Agricultural Area shall be
primarily responsible for paying the costs of the abatement of that pollution. For
purposes of this subsection, the terms "Everglades Protection Area" and
"Everglades Agricultural Area" shall have the meanings as defined in statutes in
effect on January 1, 1996.
FLA. CONST. art. II, §7.

17. Amendment 5 (Everglades), 706 So. 2d at 283.
18. Id.at 281.
19. See id.at 281-82.
20. See id.at 279-80.
21. See id.at 282-83. The court found content for "primarily responsible" in ordinary
dictionary definitions of the words "responsible" and "primarily." See id.Dictionary definitions
are relevant, it was said, because initiative terms are to be read from the perspective of the voters,
and therefore in light of "the natural and popular meaning in which the words are usually
understood by the people who have adopted them." Id. at 282 (quoting City of Jacksonville v.
Cont'l Can Co., 151 So. 488, 489-90 (Fla. 1933)).
22. Id. at 283. This definition was not, in fact, the only possible reading of the constitutional
language. The word "primarily" was made out to mean, given the dictionary study, that individual
polluters "bear their share" but not "the total burden." Id. Legally familiar uses of the term might
suggest that polluters are responsible "first," up to the limits of their assets, or "more than half,"
again insofar as their assets allow. Id. at 282. These latter readings would have treated the
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Why couldn't the Justices also assign meanings to other amend-

ment terms?2 3 This question seems to call for some effort to elaborate
the Bryant notion of "sufficient rule." But the Everglades court took a
different tack. The Justices called attention to the placement of the
amendment within the Florida Constitution. It is subsection (b) of section 7 of article II. Subsection (a) of this section states: "It shall be the
policy of the state to conserve and protect its natural resources and
scenic beauty. Adequate provision shall be made by law for the abatement of air and water pollution and of excessive and unnecessary

noise."24 The court, plausibly enough, concluded that the new amendment should be read in pari materia with subsection (a), but also
asserted that subsection (a) "directs the legislature to provide by statute
for the 'abatement of air and water pollution."'2 5 It therefore made sense
textually-supposedly-to read the new amendment as not self-executing. This argument, however, plainly doesn't work. The literal wording

of subsection (a) is "provision shall be made by law."2 6 "Law" in principle might be either legislative or judicial in origin-common law, in this
instance "constitutional common law." 27 Section 7 is part of article II,
the constitution's general provisions, and not article III, specifically discussing the Florida Legislature. The constitutional context thus does not
demand an equation of "law" and "legislation." The amendment might,
as a matter of textual mechanics, be properly treated as addressing judiamendment itself as having resolved the question of responsibility in both the senses of liability
and remedy and to have therefore put polluters at immediate risk. The Florida Supreme Court's
gloss, however, presented the questions of responsibility and "share" as functions of causation and
therefore as factual questions somehow still to be resolved. Perhaps especially because the court
also holds that this resolution first supposes legislative action, the legal risk for polluters
occasioned by the amendment is put (far) off.
23. If dictionary definitions can do so much substantive work, why not use this same resource
to resolve the amendment's other questions? The advisory opinion notes that the open issues
include "what constitutes 'water pollution'; how will one be adjudged a polluter; how will the cost
of pollution abatement be assessed; and by whom might such a claim be asserted." Id. at 281.
These questions do not seem to be obviously different in kind from the question the court answers.
The third item in the list, we might think, was indeed already resolved by the court's own
construction of "primarily responsible." The most important word in the list is almost surely
"adjudged." A self-executing amendment is evidently one ready-made for judicial use. Dictionary
definitions presumably do not meet courtroom needs-do not supply intermediate premises with
which judges might fashion rules about elements of complaints and answers, and, therefore, rules
of standing and burdens of proof. But judges, we all know, have access to common law norms,
which do provide raw materials for gap-filling. Especially given the particular content the
Supreme Court attributed to "primarily responsible," obviously evocative of familiar
presuppositions of corrective justice, we might think that the Everglades amendment would not
require unusual efforts on the part of enforcing judges.
24. FLA. CONST. art. II. § 7.
25. Amendment 5 (Everglades), 706 So. 2d at 281.
26. FLA. CoNsT. art. II. § 7.
27. See generally Henry P. Monaghan, Foreword:ConstitutionalCommon Law, 89 HARv. L.
Rav. 1 (1975) (concept within federal constitutional law).
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cial enforcers-as therefore self-executing. The Court's analysis begs
the question.
The recent Florida Supreme Court decision in Florida Hospital
Waterman, Inc. v. Buster 8 treated self-execution as a straightforward
matter. 2004 Amendment 7, codified as article X, section 25 of the Florida Constitution, granted medical patients "a right to have access to any
records made or received ... by a health care facility ... relating to any
adverse medical incident. '29 The constitutional amendment stated a
"sufficient rule" and thus met the Bryant test: "[A]ll key terms are
defined within the amendment," and "the amendment expressly
declare[d] that it is to be effective on passage, indicating that its effectiveness in overriding prior statutory law was not to be dependent upon
the enactment of implementing legislation." 3 Amendment 7, as the
Court understood it, was tantamount to a statutory repeal-removing
legislatively-created barriers blocking individuals seeking access to
records created for purposes of hospital peer review and staffing decisions. 3' But the Court was notably not interested in characterizing the
state of the law as it would stand after the constitutional repeal of peer
review shields.32 In Buster, as in the Everglades opinion, the Florida
Supreme Court opted for quick work rather than extended analyses. We
learn little about the underpinnings of the "self execution" idea.
II.

ARMSTRONG'S UNCERTAIN DOMAIN

It should be easy, we might think, to defend the proposition that
ballot summaries misleadingly describing proposed constitutional
amendments are no good and cast a cloud over voter choices made while
working with ballots incorporating the false summaries. There is nothing
28. 984 So. 2d 478 (Fla. 2008).
29. FLA. CONST. art. X, § 25.
30. Fla. Hosp. Waterman, Inc., 984 So. 2d. at 486.
31. Passages in the Supreme Court's discussion of the application of amendment 7 to preexisting records are especially clear in this regard-for example: "The summary indicates that,
with the passage of the amendment, there would no longer be any legal barrier to obtaining this
information .... Because the statutory restrictions constituted the only barrier to production ...
doing away with the restrictions by constitutional amendment effectively removed the lone
obstacle to access." Id. at 489; see also id. at 488 (several similar statements).
32. The opinion spends much more time addressing the question of whether the amendment
applies to records created prior to the amendment's passage. The court rules in favor of
applicability, but only after a complicated and not entirely persuasive effort to show that the
statutory confidentiality rules were not in some sense vested-provided no basis for reliance, etc.
Why did the court have to do this? Why not rule that the previous regime mattered but the

amendment replaced it? Due process? But why not read the amendment as implicitly altering
ordinary due process understandings? Or rather, if the amendment's consequences were
acknowledged as difficult-real losses as well as gains-wouldn't that have served as an
argument for leaving the legislature room to manage the impact-at least with regard to alreadycreated records?
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so esoteric here as the notions of "self-executing provisions" and "sufficient rule." But that's not in fact the case. The Florida Supreme Court's
efforts to work out the implications of problematic amendment ballot
summaries, across a long line of decisions, are-in the aggregate, anyway-notably unresolved.3 3
34
The leading case at present is Armstrong v. Harris.
There, the
Florida Supreme Court held that the ballot title and summary of a legislatively proposed constitutional amendment were inaccurate, accordingly inconsistent with constitutional and statutory requirements, thus
marking the proposed amendment as wrongly presented to general election voters-even though the election had already been held and the
voters had approved the amendment. The proposal addressed article I,
section 17, of the Florida Constitution, changed (inter alia) the phrase
"cruel or unusual punishment" to "cruel and unusual punishment," and
also obligated Florida courts to construe the revised formula "in conformity with decisions of the United States Supreme Court" interpreting
"cruel and unusual punishment" for purposes of the Eighth Amendment.35 The ballot summary and title, Armstrong decreed, gave "no hint
of the radical change in state constitutional law that the text actually
foments." 36 Changing "or" to "and" and, more importantly, adopting
federal constitutional understandings as decisive not only removed an
independent Florida constitutional protection over and above the federal
Eighth Amendment, but likely weakened punishment restraints hitherto
enforced. "When Florida citizens are being called upon to nullify an
original act of the Founding Fathers, each citizen is entitled-indeed,
37
each is duty-bound-to cast a ballot with eyes wide open."
The Florida Legislature, after amending statutory language to take
ballot summaries describing legislatively-proposed amendments outside
the reach of word limits regulating initiative or commission proposed
amendments, reenacted the amendment proposal, substituting a new ballot summary that reproduced the language of the proposed amendment
in its entirety, prefaced by a careful summary calling attention to the
implications of the proposal that Armstrong had noted as missing or misrepresented. Notwithstanding election supervisors, who thought that the
summary was "too long," the First District Court of Appeal upheld the
new ballot language, concluding that it indeed "accurately describes the
33. For a useful introduction to the (sometimes complicated) procedural aspects of ballot
summary litigation, see Robert M. Norway, Judicial Review of Initiative Petitions in Florida,5
FLA. COASTAL L. REV. 15, 21-27 (2004).
34. 773 So. 2d 7 (Fla. 2000), cert. denied, 532 U.S. 958 (2001).
35. See id. at 16 n.25.
36. Id. at 21.
37. Id. at 22.
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amendment."3 8 Florida voters again approved the amendment, now (as a
result) part of the Florida Constitution.39
A tempest in a teapot? One of "the boldest ventures in judicial
activism" in recent years?40 Neither, maybe: Armstrong is, in fact, one in
a sequence of Florida court decisions addressing ballot language accuracy and related problems. This long line of cases is-we shall see-not
straightforward. The most recent opinions, speedily accumulating since
Armstrong, underscore complexity seemingly despite themselves.
A.

After Armstrong

Subsequent Florida court decisions take Armstrong as a point of
departure. 4 ' Opinions testing the accuracy of ballot titles and summaries
pretty much rely on a common collection of formulas for purposes of
characterizing their inquiries. "A ballot title and summary cannot either
'fly under false colors' or 'hide the ball' as to the amendment's true
effect."4 2 "IT]he wording of the title and summary" must be "sufficient
to communicate the chief purpose of the measure"-need not "explain
every detail or ramification," but rather "accurately describe the scope of
the text of the amendment," so as to afford "fair notice of the content"
38. Sancho v. Smith, 830 So. 2d 856, 859-60, 863, 861 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 2002).
39. See FLA. CONST. art. 1, § 17.
40. Arthur D. Hellman, JudicialActivism: The Good, the Bad, and the Ugly, 21 Miss. C. L.
REV. 253, 253 (2002).
41. For decisions concerning legislatively proposed amendments, see, e.g., Kainen v. Harris,
769 So. 2d 1029, 1031-32, 1035 (Fla. 2000) (Anstead & Pariente, JJ., concurring); Fla.
Hometown Democracy, Inc. v. Cobb, 953 So. 2d 666, 671 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 2007); Sancho,
830 So. 2d at 861; Fla. Ass'n of Realtors v. Smith, 825 So. 2d 532, 536 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App.
2002). See also City of Miami v. Staats, 919 So. 2d 485, 486 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 2005)
(municipal straw ballot resolution). Armstrong figures hardly at all in some rulings in which
initiative-proposed amendments are at issue, even though the Supreme Court treats accurate ballot
titles and summaries as obligatory in this context also. See, e.g., In re Med. Liab. Claimant's
Comp. Amendment., 880 So. 2d 675 (Fla. 2004); In re Pub. Prot. from Repeated Med.
Malpractice, 880 So. 2d 667, 671-73 (Fla.2004); In re Same Fee for Same Health Care Serv., 880
So. 2d 659, 665 (Fla. 2004). But see Repeated Med. Malpractice, 880 So. 2d at 674 (Pariente, C.J,
concurring); Med. Liab. Claimant's Comp. Amendment, 880 So. 2d at 681 (Lewis, J., dissenting).
In these cases, notably, the Court relies on the same statute invoked in Armstrong but pretty much
ignores Armstrong's parallel constitutional norm. Constitutionally, it seems, initiative-proposed
amendments and legislatively proposed amendments are different. Or maybe not: In both lines of
cases, proposed amendments are sometimes struck down. See, e.g., In re Referenda for Local
Land Use Plans, 902 So. 2d 763 (Fla. 2005); Fla. Ass'n of Realtors, 825 So. 2d at 533. And
references to Armstrong have begun to appear more often in the most recent initiative cases, see,
e.g., In re 1.35% Property Tax Cap, 2 So. 3d 968, 974 (Fla. 2009); In re Nonpartisan Comm'n to
Apportion Legislative Dists, 926 So. 2d 1218, 1227 (Fla. 2006); Floridians Against Expanded
Gambling v. Floridians for Level Playing Field, 945 So. 2d 553, 559 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App.
2006).
42. Armstrong v. Harris, 773 So. 2d 7, 16 (Fla.2000), cert. denied, 532 U.S. 958 (2001); see
Med. Liab. Claimant's Comp., 880 So. 2d at 681 (Lewis, J., dissenting); FloridiansAgainst
Expanded Gambling, 945 So .2d at 559.
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enabling the voter to "cast an intelligent and informed ballot. '43 Summary language cannot substitute "editorial comment" for "accurate summary."' A ballot title and summary cannot "make false promises of
benefits when they really take away and restrict existing rights."4 5 Nor
can "they suggest[ ] that the proposed amendments would result in new
limitations or impose stricter limitations with regard to certain activities
than had prior law, when in fact, the chief purposes of the proposed
amendments were to create exceptions to preexisting limitations on
those activities. 4 6 A ballot title and summary cannot "conceal[ ] what
appears to be the most significant component of the proposed amendment. '47 An "exhaustive explanation" is not necessary, but there must be
"no hidden meanings or deceptive phrases. '4 8 "Perfection is not
required, and common sense suggests that no matter how the ballot language is worded there will always be those who fear the wording itself
favors passage or defeat."' 49 But "no voter" should "be confused about
what is at stake." 50
This common approach is especially notable given the manifest
weakness of the foundations that constitutional and statutory language
offer. Article XI, section 5(a), of the Florida Constitution provides:
A proposed amendment to or revision of this constitution, or any part
of it, shall be submitted to the electors at the next general election
held more than ninety days after the joint resolution or report of revision commission, constitutional convention or taxation and budget
reform commission proposing it is filed with the custodian of state
records, unless, pursuant to law enacted by the affirmative vote of
three-fourths of the membership of each house of the legislature and
limited to a single amendment or revision, it is submitted at an earlier
special election held more than ninety days after such filing.
There is no discussion whatsoever of ballot summaries in this constitutional text. In Armstrong, Justice Shaw insisted that "the requirement that the proposed amendment be accurately represented on the
ballot" is nonetheless "[i]mplicit in this provision. '5 1 "[O]therwise, voter
43. Med. Liab. Claimant's Comp., 880 So. 2d at 679 (interior quotation marks and citations
omitted); see, e.g., In re Funding of Embryonic Stem Cell Research ,959 So. 2d 195, 201 (Fla.
2007); Nonpartisan Comm'n to Apportion Legislative Dists, 926 So. 2d at 1228; Carroll v.
Firestone, 497 So. 2d 1204, 1206 (Fla. 1986).
44. Local Land Use Plans, 902 So. 2d at 771-72; see Evans v. Firestone, 457 So. 2d 1351,
1355 (Fla. 1984).
45. Med. Liab. Claimant's Comp., 880 So. 2d at 682 (Lewis, J., dissenting).
46. Repeated Med. Malpractice, 880 So. 2d at 673.
47. Fla. Ass'n of Realtors v. Smith, 825 So. 2d 532, 538 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 2002).
48. In re Same Fee for Same Health Care Serv., 880 So. 2d 659, 666 (Fla. 2004).
49. Kainen v. Harris, 769 So. 2d 1029, 1033 (Fla. 2000) (Anstead, J., concurring)
50. Sancho v. Smith, 830 So. 2d 856, 862 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 2002).
51. Armstrong v. Harris, 773 So. 2d 7, 12 (Fla. 2000), cert. denied, 532 U.S. 958 (2001).
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approval would be a nullity."5 2 This conclusion is in a sense obvious: It
is the "proposed amendment" that must be "submitted," and if a ballot
summary diverges enough from the text of the proposed amendment it
could fairly be said that the proposal was not actually "submitted." 5 3 But
this chain of reasoning (even if it captures Shaw's underlying thought
process) does not appear to point towards the elaborate gloss that Florida
courts have given the accuracy requirement-or indeed any other particular reading.
Shaw also characterized Florida Statutes section 101.161 (1) as having "codified ...

[t]his accuracy requirement. 54 The statute declares:

Whenever a constitutional amendment or other public measure is
submitted to the vote of the people, the substance of such amendment
or other public measure shall be printed in clear and unambiguous
language on the ballot after the list of candidates, followed by the
word "yes" and also by the word "no," and shall be styled in such a
manner that a "yes" vote will indicate approval of the proposal and a
"no" vote will indicate rejection. The wording of the substance of the
amendment or other public measure and the ballot title to appear on
the ballot shall be embodied in the joint resolution, constitutional
revision commission proposal, constitutional convention proposal,
taxation and budget reform commission proposal or enabling resolu[T]he substance of the amendment or other

tion or ordinance ....

public measure shall be an explanatory statement, not exceeding 75
words in length, of the chief purpose of the measure ....

The ballot

length, by
title shall consist of a caption, not exceeding 15 words in 55
which the measure is commonly referred to or spoken of.

"[C]lear and unambiguous language" seems to be-within the sentence in which it appears-a reference to typeface or other printing concerns and not a requirement of substantive accuracy. If so, it is not easy
to see why "chief purpose of the measure" is necessarily a strongly regulatory phrase rather than a loose definition of "explanatory statement"
instructing but otherwise not limiting drafters.
Pretty plainly, Florida judging drives the development of the ballot
summary accuracy requirement.
B.

Before Armstrong

Armstrong and the other recent decisions are not innovative. Justice
52. Id.
53. Id.
54. Id.
55. FLA. STAT. § 101.161(a) (2007). During the course of the Armstrong litigation, the Florida
Legislature acted to exempt legislature-proposed amendments from the summary word limit. See
Sancho, 830 So. 2d at 859.
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Shaw noted a sequence of Florida Supreme Court decisions ranging
across the twentieth century enforcing accuracy requirements or cognate
restraints.16 This is, we are led to see, long-time judicial work. The older
cases, though, complicate matters-unsettle rather than reassure.
Askew v. Firestone57-the opinion first cited in the Armstrong footnote and put to use repeatedly throughout Justice Shaw's opinion-was
not only the source of the "false colors" phrase,58 but also supplied Armstrong with the canonical formulation of the fair notice explanation of
the accuracy requirement. The language that Justice Shaw quotes in
Armstrong appears in the Askew opinion as itself a quotation (Shaw
makes this clear in Armstrong59) of a passage from the Supreme Court's
much earlier decision in Hill v. Milander: "All that the Constitution
requires or that the law compels or ought to compel is that the voter have
notice of that which he must decide .... What the law requires is that the
ballot be fair and advise the voter sufficiently to enable him intelligently
to cast his ballot."6 Justice McDonald, in quoting from the Hill opinion
in Askew, omitted (marked with ellipses) what were-in 1954-arguably the most important sentences. Justice Drew's original opinion in Hill
read as follows:
All that the Constitution requires or that the law compels or ought to
compel is that the voter have notice of that which he must decide. It
is a matter of common knowledge that many weeks are consumed, in
advance of elections, apprising the electorate of the issues to be determined and that in this day and age of radio, television, newspaper and
the many other means of communicating and disseminating information, it is idle to argue that every proposition on a ballot must appear
at great and undue length. Such would hamper instead of aiding the
intelligent exercise of the privilege of voting. It is a matter of common knowledge that one does not wait until he enters the election
booth to decide how he is going to cast his ballot. What the law
the voter sufficiently to
requires is that the ballot be fair and advise
61
enable him intelligently to cast his ballot.
Hill was a very different case, on its facts, from Armstrong and
Askew. Both of the latter decisions addressed disputes focused on the
accuracy of ballot summaries of constitutional amendments. Hill dealt
56. See Armstrong, 773 So. 2d at 12 n.15.
57. 421 So. 2d 151 (Fla. 1982).
58. Id. at 156; see Armstrong, 773 So. 2d at 16.
59. See Armstrong, 773 So. 2d at 12 n.15.
60. Askew, 421 So. 2d at 155 (quoting Hill v. Milander, 72 So. 2d 796, 798 (Fla. 1954))
(emphasis omitted); see Armstrong, 773 So. 2d at 12. At another point in the opinion, Armstrong
straightforwardly condenses Askew's quotation: "[Tihe Constitution requires ... that the ballot be
fair and advise the voter sufficiently to enable him intelligently to cast his ballot." Id. at 12 n.15.
61. Hill, 72 So. 2d at 798.
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with an argument that, as a matter of statutory construction, a special
law conditioned on a referendum required that the entirety of the bill to
be presented to the voters be printed on the ballot. As Drew noted, this
reading created a practical problem. "In the first place, we take judicial
knowledge of the limitations inherent in the use of voting machines so
far as the amount of printed material thereon is concerned. 6 2 Fair notice
was therefore the relevant concern. "In numerous instances we have held
that the only requirements in an election of this kind are that the voter
should not be misled and that he have an opportunity to know and be on
notice as to the proposition on which he is to cast his vote."6 3 Hill starts,

it appears, from an assumption that is distinctly subversive for present
purposes: ballot language implicates fair notice concerns, but fair notice
does not entail voter education in the voting booth as such; education
occurs earlier and outside the voting process per se. If Justice Drew
writes persuasively in Hill (he certainly writes forcefully), the relatively
rigorous accuracy requirement of Askew and Armstrong-regardlessof
whether it is statutory or constitutional in origin-is superfluous, simply
unnecessary given what we know as "a matter of common
knowledge."64
62. Id.
63. Id.
64. Hill v. Milander does not stand alone. Drew invoked the decade-earlier decision in
Sylvester v. Tindall, 18 So. 2d 892 (Fla. 1944); see Hill, 72 So. 2d at 798. Sylvester addressed a
very short summary of a complex legislatively proposed constitutional amendment establishing a
Game and Fresh Water Fish Commission. See Sylvester, 18 So. 2d at 894-95, 896. It included
language of a piece with Hill's view that voter education occurs in advance of election day.
We are inclined to the opinion that the form of the ballot pertaining to this particular
amendment was sufficient to put the electorate on notice as to the amendment they
were voting upon, especially in view of the three months publication of the
amendment and the posting of a complete copy of it in each voting place.
Id. at 895. But this was advertised as dictum. The court instead relied on an ostensibly different
conclusion:
[O]nce an amendment is duly proposed and is actually published and submitted to a
vote of the people and by them adopted without any question having been raised
prior to the election as to the method by which the amendment gets before them, the
effect of a favorable vote by the people is to cure defects in the form of the
submission.
Id. This "almost universal rule," was applicable in the case at hand since "any irregularity in the
... Id. at 895-96. (Perhaps the fair notice
form of the ballot . . . was not a serious one.
discussion was not dictum after all.)
Sylvester itself echoed earlier opinions. In Collier v. Gray in 1934 Justice Ellis had already
stated at some length a similar set of propositions:
Constitutional provisions derive their force not from the Legislature but from the
people in whom, under our theory of government, the power is inherent .... Even
in case some required form of procedure has been omitted by the Legislature in
submitting a proposal to amend the Constitution but the same has been advertised or
the notices published and the people have approved it at an election, the amendment
becomes a valid part of the Constitution ....
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An approach not at all like Hill's, however, governed in 1912 in
Crawford v. Gilchrist, which, along with Askew, was also prominently
quoted in Armstrong.65 Crawford arose because the Florida Senate, having approved a proposed amendment by the required three-fifths vote,
agreed to a motion to reconsider, but thereafter failed to address the
question of the amendment again. A closely split Florida Supreme Court
held that the amendment could not be submitted to the voters. Chief
Justice Whitfield reasoned:
The people of the state have a right to amend their Constitution, and
they also have a right to require proposed amendments to be agreed
to and submitted for adoption in the manner prescribed by the
existing Constitution, which is the fundamental law. If essential
mandatory provisions of the organic law are ignored in amending the
Constitution of the state, and vital elements of a valid amendment are
omitted, it violates the right of all the people of the state to government regulated by law.6 6
The reconsideration procedure was not itself constitutional; but it was
governed by a Senate rule covered by a constitutional authorization to
the legislative houses to "determine the rules of ... proceedings. '67 Legislative consideration of a proposed constitutional amendment was, it
seemed to Whitfield, supposed to be undertaken in accord with "regular"
legislative process. "The proposal of amendments to the Constitution is
a highly important function of government that should be performed
68
with the greatest certainty, efficiency, care, and deliberation.
Armstrong cannot be understood, it is plain, as a direct elaboration
of a particular constitutional provision. It is also not a straightforward
restatement of some well-established judicial understanding of constitutional requirements. There are decisions prior to Armstrong that point in
the same direction. But there are many other opinions resting on what
The difficulties which lie in the way of the people to amend the Constitution seem
to emphasize the reasonableness of the rule that too strict a construction of the
modes of procedure prescribed by legislative regulations and forms for the exercise
of the power to submit a proposal to amend is not advisable or consistent with our
institutions where the Constitution itself has provided a complete system for that
purpose.... The opportunity should be afforded the people, with the least amount
of technical departmental obstructions consistent with the letter and spirit of the
constitutional provisions on the subject, to express their desire as to a supposedly
needed change in the Constitution.
157 So. 40, 45 (Fla. 1934). West v. State, the first in this line of cases, was succinct: "in
constitutional changes the popular voice is the paramount act .... " 39 So. 412, 414 (Fla. 1905)
(West did not deal with a ballot summary issue, but a constitutional legislative journaling

requirement).
65. Crawford v. Gilchrist, 59 So. 963 (Fla. 1912); see Armstrong, 773 So. 2d at 13.
66. Crawford, 59 So. at 967-68.

67. id. at 968.
68. Id.
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seems to be contrary thinking. The divided case law puts into question
the good sense of the Armstrong rule. Why must drafters of a ballot

summary identify the principal "ramifications" of a proposed amendment? Justice Drew wrote quite convincingly in Hill v. Milander: it is
the institutions and practices of public debate in advance of election day
that carry the burden (and should carry the burden) of voter education.6 9
Ballot summaries, even after Armstrong, cannot convey much information-they are at best aids to memory.7 ° We probably do not want voters

to think about amendments for the first time during the process of voting
itself (although many no doubt do). There is also the matter of popular
sovereignty: what follows if we suppose elections to possess the "capacity to represent democratic will."'" It would not seem to be the business
of government, past some very minimal threshold, to identify the relevant issues for voters. Elections are, after all, in important part processes
through which what matters and what does not matter come to be identified. Even minimal scrutiny, of course, might reveal that a given ballot

summary is grossly misleading. But that was not the case in Armstrong
itself. The amendment there did not "fly under false colors" at the most
general level-its summary made clear that the amendment was prodeath penalty even if it did not dwell on what would be lost in achieving
72
this tilt.
In Crawford v. Gilchrist, Chief Justice Whitfield appears to have
69. Hill, 72 So. 2d at 798. Professor Lowenstein makes the point especially emphatically:
The notion that members of Congress or state legislatures sit down and read, much
less reread the text of the bills on which they vote is plainly erroneous, and
extending that notion to voters on a ballot proposition is absurd. Of course most
voters do not read the text of propositions and of course they are entirely rational
not to do so. The text of an initiative is carefully studied by the news media, interest
groups, and academic and other policy specialists. The expert opinions thus
generated are put into analyses of varying detail and sophistication. Voters who are
so inclined can find as much information as they wish, presented at whatever level
of complexity they can manage, in the news media, from various organizations, and
nowadays, on the internet. Most voters do not go to the trouble of seeking out such
information. But it does not follow that even the majority of voters cast their votes
ignorantly or randomly. Rather, in the course of their daily lives, such voters pick up
bits and pieces of information about the measure, especially information about who
is in favor and who is opposed, and they use that information as a short cut to form a
judgment that is certainly not foolproof but is not at all irrational.
Daniel H. Lowenstein, Initiatives and the New Single Subject Rule, I ELECTION L.J. 35, 46 (2002).
For thorough summary of studies of media influence on initiative voters, see Jane S. Schacter, The
Pursuit of "Popular Intent:" Interpretive Dilemmas in Direct Democracy, 105 YALE L.J. 107,
131-38 (1995).
70. But see Sancho v. Smith, 830 So. 2d 856, 860 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 2002) (post
Armstrong reprint of entirety of amendment).
71. Jonathan Simon, Why Do You Think They Call It Capital Punishment? Reading the
Killing State, 36 LAW & Soc'Y Rav. 783, 803 (2002).
72. For extended, thoughtful discussion, see id. at 800-05.
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appreciated the difficulties created by focusing on the "right to amend"
held by "the people of the State"-he elegantly shifted judicial attention
to a second "right of . . .the people"-to "government regulated by
law."73 Armstrong, not surprisingly, made much of his opinion. But
what "law" requires, of course, was precisely the question in Crawford
(and in Armstrong and Askew). Whitfield confronted an easier task than
his successors would face. Because the question concerned the initial
legislative vote-whether that vote had indeed occurred-and not the
subsequent referendum, he could work with ordinary rules of legislative
procedure codified in Jefferson's famous Manual, demonstrate their status as "law," show the manifest departure in the case at hand, and reach
his conclusion that there had been no "vote" in a lawful and therefore
constitutional sense." In Armstrong and Askew, Justices Shaw and
McDonald proceeded without any similar recourse.7 5

III.

"BRASS, IRON, AND CLAY"-AMENDMENTS

AND

CONSTITUTIONAL FORM

It is possible to develop another, hopefully more useful, approach
to dealing with the Bryant and Armstrong sequences by taking a step
back conceptually. I begin by considering problems that constitutional
73. Crawford v. Gilchrist, 59 So. 963, 966, 967-68 (Fla. 1912).
74. See Crawford, 59 So. at 968-69 (Fla. 1912).
75. A recent en banc decision of the First District Court of Appeal relies in important part on
Crawford (and in part on Armstrong as well). Floridians Against Expanded Gambling v.
Floridians for Level Playing Field, 945 So. 2d 553 (Fla. Ist Dist. Ct. App. 2006) (en banc). The
plaintiffs in Floridians Against Expanded Gambling challenged a proposed constitutional
amendment placed on the 2004 ballot-subsequently approved by the voters-that authorized
referenda in Miami-Dade and Broward Counties concerning installation of slot machines in parimutual facilities. Id. at 555-56. Allegedly, proponents of the measure "committed massive fraud
to create the illusion of compliance" with the constitutional condition that a specified number of
petition signatures be obtained before a proposed amendment could be presented to voters. Id. at
556 n.2, 557; see generally FLA. CONST. art. XI, § 3. Notwithstanding intervening voter approval
of the amendment, the First District ruled, the fraud allegations-if proved-would nullify the
amendment:
It is clear that a favorable popular vote cannot cure deception. . . . Essential
constitutional prerequisites to the publication and submission of a proposed
amendment to the Constitution are not immaterial, technical forms, but vital
elements in the adoption of constitutional amendments .... [F]raud is substantial,
and not minor, to the extent that, but for the fraudulent actions, the constitutional
amendment would not have been presented to the public in the general election.
FloridiansAgainst Expanded Gambling, 945 So. 2d at 559-61. The FloridiansAgainst Expanded
Gambling opinion cites Armstrong almost as often as Crawford. It is clear, though, that Crawford
is the model: legality is the overriding theme, and although the fraud alleged threatens
constitutional processes, familiar elements of common law fraud-independently of the
immediate constitutional context-ultimately organize judicial specification of the wrongfulness
of the challenged conduct. It is the wrongfulness of fraud-in general-that establishes the
wrongfulness of the challenged acts. For further discussion, see text infra Part IV. B. 3.
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amendments create for constitutional organization overall-for constitutions considered as working (and therefore workable) legal documents.
These explorations, I will ultimately argue, reveal a vocabulary within
which the self-execution and ballot accuracy questions can be addressed
that may be plausibly thought to fix parameters for considering particular cases.
The project is not new. The first extended discussion of constitutional amendments occurred, it appears, in the course of congressional
deliberation over proposals-managed in the House of Representatives
by James Madison-that would ultimately become the Bill of Rights,
the first ten amendments to the United States Constitution. 6 Inter alia,
the House addressed a basic formal question (raised by Roger Sherman):
whether the Bill of Rights amendments would, as Madison's drafting
suggested, be presented as inserts at particular points in the original constitutional text, or rather, as Sherman contended, be better placed at the
end of the Constitution without cross-references.
MR. SHERMAN: We ought not to interweave our propositions into the
work itself, because it will be destructive of the whole fabric. We
might as well endeavor to mix brass, iron and clay, as to incorporate
such heterogeneous articles; the one contradictory to the other....
Beside this, sir, it is questionable, whether we have the right to propose amendments in this way. The constitution is the act of the people, and ought to remain entire. But the amendments will be the act of
the state governments; again all the authority we possess, is derived
from that instrument; if we mean to destroy the whole and establish a
new constitution, we remove the basis on which we mean to build.77
MR. MADISON: Now it appears to me, that there is a neatness and
propriety in incorporating the amendments into the constitution itself;
in that case the system will remain uniform and entire; it will certainly be more simple, when the amendments are interwoven into
those parts to which they naturally belong, than it will if they consist
of separate and distinct parts; we shall then be able to determine its
meaning without references or comparison; whereas, if they are supplementary, its meaning can only be ascertained by a comparison of
the two instruments, which will be a very considerable embarrassment, it will be difficult to ascertain to what parts of the instrument
the amendments particularly refer; they will create unfavorable comparisons, whereas if they are placed upon the footing here proposed,
76. See

DAVID

E. KYVIG,

EXPLICIT AND

AurHENrIc

AcTs:

AMENDING

THE

U.S.

CONSTITUrION, 1776-1995, at 87-109 (1996).
77. 1 ANNALS OF CONG. 734-35 (Joseph Gales, ed., 1834), reprintedin CREATING THE BILL
OF RIGHTS: THE DoCuMENTARY RECORD FROM THE FIRST FEDERAL CONGRESS 117 (Helen E. Veit

et al. eds., 1991). There were several efforts to report debates in the House of Representativesnone is a transcript as such, but the Congressional Register published the most complete attempts.
See id. at 55-56.
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they will stand upon as good foundation as the original work.7 8
MR. GERRY: If we proceed in the way proposed by the honorable
gentleman from Connecticut, I presume the title of our first amendment will be, a supplement to the constitution of the United States;
the next a supplement to the supplement, and so on, until we have
supplements annexed five times in five years, wrapping up the constitution in a maze of perplexity; and as great an adept as that honorable
gentlemen is at finding out the truth, it will take him, I apprehend, a
week or a fortnight's study to ascertain the true meaning of the constitution. [Roger Sherman was a Yale professor of divinity.] ...

[I]f

they are to be received as equal in authority, we shall have five or six
constitutions, perhaps differing in material points from each other,
but all equally valid; so that they require a man of science to determine what is or is not the constitution ..

.

The arguments of Madison, Gerry, and their supporters initially
prevailed in the House of Representatives.8 0 But the House subsequently
opted for Sherman's approach, with the Senate ultimately concurring.8
Both amendment forms persist in contemporary practice (Florida, for
example, follows Madison.8 2 ) The debate-encompassing more than
these passages 83-was thus in one sense close to inconclusive. There
was also, nonetheless, a notable underlying agreement. The Constitution
should not become "heterogeneous" (Sherman) or "a maze of perplexity" (Gerry)-both Madison and Sherman said that it should "remain
entire," a "whole fabric" (Sherman) or "system" (Madison) would otherwise be put at risk. We may think that neither formal solution would
squarely fix constitutional order. It is as easy to imagine either inserts or
supplements in some instances "differing in material points" (Gerry)
from original text, suggesting "unfavorable comparisons" (Madison),
"the one contradictory to the other" (Sherman). The problem, really, is
as much a matter of substance as of form.
If so, we ought to treat the problem of constitutional organization as
chronic, as recurring, as raised to greater or lesser degree by every
amendment, not always entirely resolvable. Constitutional organization
78. Id. at 118. Representative Vining added:
If the mode proposed ... was adopted, the system would be distorted, and like a
careless written letter, have more matter attached to it in a postscript than was
contained in the original composition. The constitution being a great and important
work, ought all to be brought into one view, and made as intelligible as possible.
Id. at 120.
79. Id. at 122.
80. See KyviG, supra note 76, at 102.
81. See id. at 102, 104. The Senate debated secretly.
82. See, e.g., In re Extending Existing Sales Tax, 953 So. 2d 471, 480, 486-87, 489-90 (Fla.

2000) (quoting three proposed amendments).
83. For full reports, collected from several sources, see VErr Er AL., supra note 77, at 197-98.
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becomes part of the ordinary problem set of constitutional analysis. This
is my point of departure. In this section I sketch some models of how
constitutions might be put together. In section IV I draw on these models
in order to reconsider the Florida approaches to "self-executing" status
and ballot accuracy.
A.

Straightforward Organization

In the fall of 1875 the Florida Supreme Court issued two advisory
opinions addressing implications of then-recent amendments to the Constitution of 1868.84 These are, it appears, the first occasions on which the
Court explored in any detail the legal concomitants of constitutional
amendments.
Article VI, section 15, of the 1868 constitution originally declared:
The Governor shall appoint as many Justices of the Peace as he may
deem necessary. Justices of the Peace shall have criminal jurisdiction
and civil jurisdiction not to exceed fifty dollars; but this shall not
extend to the trial of any person for misdemeanor or crime. The
duties of the Justices of the Peace shall be fixed by law. Justices of
the Peace shall hold their offices during good 85
behavior, subject to
removal by the Governor at his own discretion.
An amendment adopted in 1875 changed that section to read:
The Governor shall appoint as many Justices of the Peace as he may
deem necessary. Justices of the Peace shall have jurisdiction in civil
actions at law in cases in which the amount or value involved does
not exceed one hundred dollars; and in criminal cases their powers
shall be fixed by law. Their powers, duties and responsibilities shall
be regulated by law. They may hold their offices for the term of four
years, subject to removal by the Governor for reasons satisfactory to
him.

86

Governor Steams asked the Justices whether the amendment itself
vacated the terms of all justices of the peace holding office at the time
the amendment was adopted, how (if this was not the case), the four year
term was to be calculated for sitting justices of the peace, and finally, if
the term ran from the date of their appointment, whether the amendment
itself therefore removed those justices of the peace who had held office
for more than four years.8 7 Justice Westcott, writing on behalf of the
Supreme Court, found the key to answering these questions in article IV,
section 14, of the constitution: "[N]o law shall be amended or revised by
84. In re Executive Commc'n of Oct. 5, 1875, 15 Fla. 735 (1875); In re Executive Commc'n
of Nov. 8, 1875, 15 Fla. 739 (1875).
85. Commc'n of Oct. 5, 15 Fla. at 736 (quoting FLA. CONST. art. VI, § 15 (1868)).
86. Id. at 737 (quoting FLA. CONST., art. VI § 15 (amended 1875)).
87. See id. at 735-36.
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reference to its title only, but in such case the act as revised, or section
as amended, shall be re-enacted and published at length. 8 8 Westcott
observed:
This section, as amended, we ...find as a whole. The power making
the amendment, following the rule prescribed for amending an ordinary act of the Legislature, instead of ordaining in exact language the
change desired, states the whole law as it is to be in the future[,]
giving so much as was embraced in the old section, which was then
in force, and which was still to be in force, as well as omitting that
which was to be no longer in force, and inserting that which was to
be of force instead of that omitted.89
As a result, he concluded, "Justices of the Peace holding commissions
from the Governor, issued under that portion of the old section which
was and still is the law, derive their authority and power as justices from
the proper constitutional authority, and hence their appointments are still
valid ... -9 But a second corollary also held:
There cannot be a Justice of the Peace holding office for the time
prescribed by the old Constitution . ..because that provision has
ceased to have any effect. There is now no law for any other tenure
than that of four years... The Constitution makes no exception. The
same rule must be applied to all Justices of the Peace. 91
That rule, Westcott was sure, included the rule applied in Marbury v.
Madison (which he quoted without attribution) and in other cases: the
date of signing and sealing a commission is the date from which time in
office begins.9 2 Justices in office more than four years, according to that
rule, therefore "ceased to be such justices," given the amendment, "the
time for which the law authorized them to hold their offices having...
expired." 93
A few weeks later, the Governor inquired again. This time, the subject was article IV,section 2, of the Constitution of 1868, which initially
provided that "[t]he session of the Legislature shall be annual ...The
Governor may, in the interim, convene the same in extra session by his
proclamation." 94 Another 1875 amendment declared instead:
From and after the first Tuesday after the first Monday in January,
A.D. one thousand eight hundred and seventy-seven, the regular session of the Legislature shall be held biennially, commencing on said
88.
89.
90.
91.
92.
93.
94.
CONST.

Id. at 736 (quoting FLA. CONST. art. IV, § 14 (1868)).
Id. at 737.
Id. at 738.
Id.
See id. at 739; Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. 137, 157-59 (1803).
See Commc'n of Oct. 5, 15 Fla. at 739.
See In re Executive Commc'n of Nov. 8, 1875, 15 Fla. 739, 740 (1875) (quoting

art. IV, § 2 (1868)).
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day and on the corresponding day of every second year thereafter; but
the Governor may convene the same in extra session by his
proclamation.9 5
Did the amendment bar a regular legislative session beginning in January, 1876? Or must the governor proclaim an extra session?
Chief Justice Randall concluded tersely that "the original section 2
...having been abrogated by the amendment, and there remaining no
provision anywhere for a regular session in January . . . . 1876," there
could be no regular session.96 But because the "original ... provision"

regarding a special session "is not changed," the governor retained the
option of convening such a session.9 7 Justice Westcott, in a separate
communication, was a little more elaborate:
In all of the States in which the method of amendment here followed
has been adopted, the unvarying rule is that nothing of the old section
which is omitted from the new section as enacted, is, in the future,
operative as law.
The very purpose of requiring the section, as amended, to be published entire, is to give certainty, by declaring the whole law, leaving
nothing open for construction.
The Legislature and people, by expressly omitting all authority for a
session in January, 1876, from the new section, and nothing but the
new section being now operative as law, it follows, necessarily, that
there is no constitutional sanction for any regular session until ...
1877.98

Why didn't Westcott and Randall regard the first phrase of the
1875 amendment as setting an effective date, thereby leaving the original 1868 provision in force until 1877? Westcott noted that he was, "as a
matter of fact, ignorant of the purposes . . . " of the drafters of the

amendment. 99 But that was an aside. What mattered was that the amendment (as Randall wrote) "abrogated" its predecessor; as a result (in
Westcott's words) "nothing but the new section" was "now operative as
law." Within the terms of the new section, read alone, there was literally
("expressly") "no constitutional sanction" for an 1876 regular session.
But then why did justices of peace appointed pursuant to the original
constitutional provision, and not yet in office for four years, keep their
jobs even after constitutional amendment? A "portion of the old section
...was and still is the law. .

. ."'

The amendment included relevant

95. Id. (quoting FLA. CONST. art. IV, § 2 (amended 1875)).
96. Id. at 741.

97. Id.
98. Id. at 742 (emphases in original). Justice Westcott agreed that the governor could, as a
matter of "your Executive discretion," convene a special session. Id.

99. Id.
100. See In re Executive Commc'n of Oct. 5, 1875, 15 Fla. 735, 738 (1875).
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language copied from its predecessor. "As to this portion reinserted, at
no time did it cease to be law."''
Justice Westcott, I think, was neither inconsistent nor confused
(Chief Justice Randall did not address the justices of the peace amendment.) His analysis was instead altogether thoroughgoing in its formality. One document-the amendment-once approved replaces the
other-the original provision. Only the new document becomes pertinent thereafter. In the case of the justices of the peace, the amendment
itself described a requirement for office that sitting justices of the peace
(or some of them) happened to meet-gubernatorial appointment. In the
case of the 1876 regular legislative session, nothing in the amendment
by its terms addressed the matter, thus leaving no constitutional basis for
such a session. But Westcott also draws on a second assumption-in
addition to regarding amendments as substituting for prior constitutional
texts, he supposes that amendments contain all pertinent language governing the subjects they address. This assumption-call it "straightforward organization"-has its root, he argues, in legislative practice
conforming, in the case of amendments as well as statutes, to the constitutional requirement stated in article IV, section 14, of the 1868 constitution: legislative revisions must take the form of redrafts of entire
"sections" and not just insertions of particular phrases.1 1 2 It is easy to
see, however, that straightforward organization is also an expectation
capable of encompassing constitutional layout as a whole."0 3
B.

Fear of Chaotic Organization

Roughly a century later, the idea of straightforward organizationapplied to both amendments and the constitution as a whole-figures
prominently in the early years after adoption of the 1968 Constitution.
This time, though, the pertinent Florida Supreme Court opinions are not
at all laconic, are indeed markedly melodramatic. Straightforward organization, it appears, is under attack. The defense proceeds chiefly by characterizing the alternative-as the Justices see it, constitutional chaos.
101. Id. at 737.

102. See id. at 736. In his first opinion-the October 5 case-Westcott depicts the legislative
practice as a kind of constitutional improvisation: "The power making the amendment, following
" Id. at 737. But, in his
the rule prescribed for amending an ordinary act of the Legislature ....
November 8 opinion, he treats legislative practice as the general custom (general constitutional
law, his contemporaries may have thought): "In all of the States in which the method of
amendment here followed has been adopted, the unvarying rule is that nothing of the old section
which is omitted from the new section as enacted, is, in the future, operative as law." Commc'n of
Nov. 8, 15 Fla. at 742.

103. See, e.g., Holland v. State, 15 Fla. 455, 461-67 (1876); Cheney v. Jones, 14 Fla. 587
(1874).
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The first case-Adams v. Gunter1 "-addressed an initiative-proposed amendment that would have added a new first section to article II
of the constitution providing for a unicameral legislature, its basic procedure for enacting laws, and a clean-up subsection obliging the new legislature to propose any additional constitutional amendments and pass any
laws necessary for full implementation of the unicameral amendment. 105
At the time, article XI, section 3, characterized "[t]he power to propose
amendments ... by initiative" as extending "to any section of this constitution." "[A]ny section" was-in context, anyway-restrictive language. 106 On its face, the amendment proposing a unicameral legislature
appeared to respect the constitutional limitation-in form it consisted of
a single section (encompassing three short subsections). The supreme
court concluded that the proposal was unconstitutional nonetheless.
Justice Drew's majority opinion read the section limitation as
enforcing the straightforward organization norm:
iT]he power reserved to the people to amend any section of the Constitution includes only the power to amend any section in such a manner that such amendment if approved would be complete within
itself, relate to one subject and not substantially affect any other section or article of the Constitution or require further amendments to
the Constitution to accomplish its purpose."0 7
Drew noted that the "cataclysmic change[ ]""18 proposed by the amendment, if adopted, would make it "immediately necessary to amend
numerous other provisions of the Constitution"-a fact "recognized in
the proposal itself." 109
[I]f such proposed amendment were adopted by the people... and if
the Legislature at its next session should fail to submit further amendments to revise and clarify the numerous inconsistencies and conflicts
104. 238 So. 2d 824 (Fla. 1970).
105. Id. at 825-28.
106. Article XI, section 1 described legislature-proposed amendments and revisions as
addressing either "a section or ... one or more articles, or the whole, of this constitution." FLA.
CONST. art. XI, §1. Article XI, section 2, authorized constitutional revision commissions to put to
place before voters proposals for "revision of this constitution or any part of it." FLA. CONST. art.
XI, §2. Article XI, section 4, provided for constitutional conventions to draft proposals for
"revision of the entire constitution." FLA. CONST. art. XI, §4.
107. See Adams, 238 So. 2d at 831.
It is ... clear from Article XI that where more than one section of the Constitution
is to be amended it is called a revision, and such revision contemplates deliberative
action of either the Legislature or a convention duly assembled in order to
accomplish harmony in language and purpose between articles and to produce as
nearly as possible a document free of doubts and inconsistencies.
Id. at 829.
108. Id. at 831.
109. Id. at 829. Justice Drew listed fifteen changes that he thought would be required. See id. at
830.
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which would result, or if ...the people should refuse to adopt them,
simple chaos would prevail in the government of this State."o
Initiative proposals of this sort, it seemed, threatened the very point of
the Constitution:
The purpose of the long and arduous work of the hundreds of men
and women and many sessions of the Legislature in bringing about
the Constitution of 1968 was to eliminate inconsistencies and conflicts and to give the State a workable, accordant, homogenous and
III
up-to-date document. All of this could disappear very quickly ....
Smathers v. Smith" 2 addressed a legislatively-proposed amendment
that would have changed article I, section 18-as originally written, a
prohibition of administrative penalties-to add authorization for the
Legislature to suspend any administrative rule it deemed to be in excess
of delegated authority." 13 Justice England, writing for six of the seven
Justices,1 14 understood the decisive issue in the case to be whether the
proposed language could indeed be treated as a section amendment, or
whether the proposal was instead tantamount to an article revision. The
legislature could propose either sort of change under article XI, section
1. But failure to place a proposal at its proper level in the constitutional
structure, it seemed, rendered the proposal invalid. England ultimately
concluded that the proposal at hand had enough in common with the
underlying aim of the existing section 18 prohibition to justify the proposal's claim to be a section amendment. Given an overarching concern
"to shield individuals from the abuses of governmental tyranny[, [t]he
limitation on administrative agency penalties has some connection,
albeit tenuous, with the sentence now added to allow the Legislature to
protect the citizenry from executive branch over-reaching."' ' 5 But the
large part of the majority opinion was taken up with explaining and justifying its concern to distinguish true section changes from disguised
article revisions in the first place. This is the most worked-out of the
several efforts:
110. Id. at 832. Justice Thomal, writing separately, explained why legislative delay would be
likely. See id. at 833 (Thomal, J., concurring).
11. Id.at 832.
112. 338 So. 2d 825 (Fla. 1976).
113. See id. at 826. The proposal also declared that the governor and cabinet could, by majority
vote, defer a suspension pending subsequent legislative action. Subsequent legislative failure to
act on a suspension (at the next regular session) would automatically reinstate the administrative
rule. Id. For a careful, extended, contemporary account of the Smathers v. Smith litigation, see
James Bacchus, Note, Legislative Efforts to Amend the Florida Constitution: The Implications of
Smathers v. Smith, 5 FLA. ST. U. L. REv. 747 (1977).
except its
114. Justice Boyd concurred "in all aspects with the majority opinion .....
approving discussion of Adams v.Gunter. See Smathers, 338 So. 2d at 832 (Boyd, J., concurring
specially).
115. Id.at 829.
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The function of a section amendment is to alter, modify or change the
substance of a single section of the Constitution containing particularized statements of organic law.... The function of an article revision is to restructure an entire class of governmental powers or
rights. .

.

. The serious business of amending a constitution by

lawmakers demands that the functional unity of sections and articles
be preserved to the fullest extent possible, so that, first, ambiguities
and contradictions be avoided and, second, cumulative confusion be
prevented.... [L]awmakers who are asked to consider constitutional
changes, and the people who are asked to approve them, must be able
to comprehend the sweep of each proposal from a fair notification in
the proposition itself that is neither less nor more extensive than it
appears to be.'" 6

Justices Drew and England worry about "chaos," "inconsistencies
and conflicts," about "ambiguities and contradictions," "cumulative confusions," "a hodgepodge of disharmonious provisions." Concurring in
Smith, Justice Boyd countered, noting that "[t]he inherent right of the
people to adopt amendments . . . permit[s] them to adopt vague and

ambiguous amendments, as well as those which are easily understood." 17' And Chief Justice Ervin, dissenting in Adams, put a similar
point more sharply:
Because a proposal may be radical, chaotic or revolutionary in the
minds of some is no justification for its rejection ab initio as unconstitutional. After all, a great degree of confidence must necessarily be
reposed in the good judgment of the people .. .to weed out the

chaotic, the radical, and the revolutionary.' 8
Drew might have responded that there was nothing (or at least not
much) for "the good judgment of the people" to engage-only the prospect of more work later. The proposal at issue in Adams was troubling
precisely because it postponed to subsequent amendments or to legislation the job of identifying and resolving whatever confusions the proposal (if adopted) would occasion. England's opinion in Smith is more
puzzling-indeed, on its face down right dissonant. Why stress the
116. Id. Variations include:
No persuasive reason has been suggested for permitting wholly random placements
of constitutional provisions by legislative amendment. It is not neatness with which
the subject of germaneness is concerned; it is respect for the people's declaration
that our organic law shall be free from the confusion and uncertainty in operation
which inevitably attend constitutional inconsistencies and ambiguities.
Our much-amended 1885 Constitution was fully revised in 1968 principally because
a hodgepodge of disharmonious provisions which had been added over the years
had made governance complex, expensive and uncertain.
Id. at 830, 829 n.14.
117. Id. at 832 (Boyd, J., concurring specially).
118. Adams v. Gunter, 238 So. 2d 824, 834 (Fla. 1970) (Ervin, C.J., dissenting).
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importance of a well-ordered constitutional text and-at the same
time-accede to an only "tenuous" explanation of the proposal's place?
This question has an answer: Weber v. Smathers." 9
Decided the same day as Smith, Weber addressed the constitutionality of Governor Askew's "Ethics in Government" initiative proposal.
The amendment added a new article II, section 8.120 Its eight subsections
required elected officials and candidates to disclose publicly financial
interests and campaign finances, framed liability and forfeiture rules for
officials and employees breaching public trust, and barred legislators or
statewide elected officials for two years after leaving office from paid
representation of individuals or entities dealing with the government
bodies in which the legislators or officials had participated. 2 ' The
amendment also prohibited sitting legislators from undertaking paid representation of individuals or entities before state agencies other than
judicial tribunals, provided for an independent commission to investigate and report with respect to breaches of public trust, and established a
default scheme for implementation in the event that the Florida Legislature did not pass needed supplemental legislation.' 2 2 The ethics amendment-from proposal through campaign and ultimate adoption-defined
an especially dramatic moment in Florida political and constitutional
history, a remarkable use of the initiative by a sitting governor challenging and seeking to reform the prevailing political culture.' 23
But in the Florida Supreme Court, it seemed, Askew's initiative
was a nonevent. After Adams v. Gunter, article XI, section 3 had been
changed-in 1972 the single section limitation gave way to a single subject requirement.124 In Weber, Chief Justice Overton declined the opportunity to explore implications of the "single subject" idea, barely
discussed Adams (even though the single subject theme plainly figured
in Justice Drew's opinion there), instead approving the ethics amendment in a single conclusory paragraph.1 25 Only Justice Roberts dis119. 338 So. 2d 819 (Fla. 1976).
120. Id. at 820.
121. Id. at 820-21.
122. Id.
123. See John F. Cooper, The Citizen Initiative Petition to Amend State Constitutions: A
Concept Whose Time Has Passed, or a Vigorous Component of ParticipatoryDemocracy at the
State Level?, 28 N.M. L. REV. 227, 233-34 (1998). See generally Jon Nordheimer, Florida's
"Supersquare"-A Man to Watch, N.Y. TIMES MAGAZINE, Mar. 5, 1972, at 11.
124. "The power to propose the revision or amendment of any portion or portions of this
constitution by initiative is reserved to the people, provided that any such revision or amendment
...shall embrace but one subject and matter directly connected therewith." FLA. CONST. art. XI,

§ 3.
125. See Weber, 338 So. 2d at 822. Justice England, concurring, attempted to fill the gap,
exploring understandings of the legislative single subject requirement, part of Florida

constitutional law since 1868, as a guide to interpreting the initiative single subject rule. See id. at
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126
sented, decrying the "rapid abandonment" of Adams.
The taciturn Weber opinion cannot hide the constitutional richness
of the Askew initiative. The idea of trusteeship was put to work not only
to police conflicts of interest as between public responsibilities and personal financial interests of elected officials. The notion of disinterestedness was also deployed to define a new, sharper separation of legislators
and administrators, to declare administration off-limits to legislator-lobbyists. Administration thus acquired space to develop its own, presumably public-interested, judicially-supervised bureaucratic ethos. The
ethics in government amendment, it might be argued, emphatically
reform impulse evident elsewhere in the
underscored the modernizing
1 27
constitution.
1968
We can also see, however, that the delegation-policing amendment
in Smith proceeded precisely contrarily (and we understandissue
at
now-why the plaintiff in the case was 1968 constitutional impresario
Chesterfield Smith.) This proposed amendment emphatically reinserted
administrators within the maelstrom of legislative processes and politics.
Bureaucratic government would not become the well-bounded preserve
of administrators and judges. The proposal at issue in Smith, thus, may
seem to have posed a real risk indeed of constitutional "hodgepodge," of
"disharmonious provisions." But that risk could only materialize if both
the Askew initiative and the anti-delegation amendment received voter
approval. As of the time that the Florida Supreme Court heard and
decided Weber and Smith, neither proposal had been put to popular vote.
In theory, the court might have resolved the prospective risk by invalidating either one of the proposals. Which one? The only sensible tackthe one that the Justices actually took, however ambivalently-was to
allow both proposals to remain on the November ballot and run the risk.
As it turned out, the electorate passed the Askew initiative and defeated
the anti-delegation proposal.
What if the voters had approved both amendments? Would that
result have threatened anything like the "chaos" that Justice Drew foresaw in Adams v. Gunter? Chaos is a vivid, evocative term. Concretely,
Drew has two fears: (1) that an amendment will presuppose changes in
other constitutional provisions but will not make the changes itself; and
(2) that an amendment purporting to be minor will (even if incom-

823 (England, J., concurring). This analogy, we know, would not hold-within a few years,
Justice Overton, ironically, would develop a distinctive, demanding reading of the single subject
notion within the initiative context. See Fine v. Firestone, 448 So. 2d 984, 989-92 (Fla. 1984);
Gudridge, supra note 2, at 822-25.
126. Weber, 338 So. 2d at 824 (Roberts, J., dissenting).
127. Professor Little discerns no large theme in the substance of the Askew initiative. See
Little, Direct Democracy, supra note 3, at 400.
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pletely) make major changes. The idea of straightforward organization-and the "section" limitation understood within its termsaddresses both fears. Justice England's fear is only slightly different:

that an amendment will be inconsistent with another constitutional provision, preventing complete implementation of both the amendment and
the other provision, or either the amendment or the other provision. A
rigorous article/section distinction implementing the idea of straightfor-

ward organization addresses this fear. (England, of course, weakens the
organizational norm in applying it in Smith v. Smathers itself.'28 )
A legal regime is chaotic if, within its workings, close starting

points too often result in outcomes or processes of elaboration that
appear to be too widely divergent to assimilate.' 2 9 The large number of
adjustments that the unicameral proposal at issue in Adams left open

raised this risk, it seemed, because some adjustments could be delayed
or not undertaken at all. Co-existing but deeply conflicting notions of
unicameral and bicameral legislatures might then utterly disrupt each
other-presuppose different answers to the same ensemble of implementing questions. Neither legislative structure would be able to estab-

lish itself in any meaningful sense. The anti-delegation proposal judged
in Smith carried with it the possibility that legislative interventions
would be ad hoc, singling out administrative rulings on no coherent
basis, generating hodgepodge. This prospect, in and of itself, did not
present a problem for constitutional organization as such. But because
(or to the extent that) the Askew amendment, if ratified, implemented a
particular idea of administrative order, constitutional conflict loomed if
the amendment at issue in Smith were also ratified. But it was just as
128. At least with respect to initiative-proposed amendments, the single subject requirement, as
ultimately understood, addresses Drew's first fear, but not his second. It would also address (were
it applicable) England's fear. See Gudridge, supra note 2, at 899-901; Appendix, infra.
129. This definition of chaos treats the underlying concern as hermeneutic, a worry about
relationships between interpretations and results given a set of constitutional starting points.
Another approach-stressed in Joseph Little's criticism-begins by distinguishing issues as either
constitutional or nonconstitutional and proceeds to evaluate amendments (or other constitutional
provisions) on the basis of whether they are therefore constitutional in substance or rather corrupt
or confuse or jumble the overall constitutional text. See, e.g., Little, Need to Revise, supra note 3,
at 478-80; Little, Direct Democracy, supra note 3, at 408-10. See also Daniel R. Gordon,
Protecting Against the State Constitutional Law Junkyard: Proposals to Limit Popular
ConstitutionalRevision in Florida, 20 NOVA L. REv. 413 (1995). Distinguishing constitutional
and nonconstitutional topics can be a tricky project, however, whatever the precise formula that
might be put to use: it would seem to call into question not just the recent run of strikingly narrow
substantive constitutional amendments (addressing, famously, a bullet train running from Tampa
through Orlando to Miami and the well-being of fish and pregnant pigs), but also, for example, an
important aspect of the organizing framework of the 1868 Florida Constitution (thus seeming to
side with the Florida Supreme Court's subsequent controversial editing) notwithstanding
Professor Little's own appreciation of the 1868 accomplishment. See Little, Need to Revise, supra
note 3, at 475. See generally Gudridge, supra note 2, at 866-77.
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true, of course, that the Askew amendment undercut the implicit normsomething very much like parliamentary government-informing the
anti-delegation proposal. We might wonder whether this conflict would
have been chaotic (had it come to pass). 3 '
C.

Complex Organization

Constitutional organization need not be straightforward. Individual
provisions might evoke or presuppose or elaborate or even counter
others. 3 ' These reverberations need not be chaotic. They might disclose
themes emergent across accumulated constitutional parts. It is some1 32
times thought that these themes describe a deep structure of sorts.
This characterization often carries with it notions of unity or consistency
or continuity-a strong sense that the themes, because they are assumed
to be integral to the constitutional text itself, fix its form well enough to
give it distinctive shape. But there is also this risk: if the themes available to be picked out diverge substantially, the idea of deep structure
loses (in the very process of elaboration) something of its claim, shows
constitutional order to be more like a jumble, an unresolved plurality,
disorder really. Emergent consonances can also be conceived otherwise
however: as indexes, orienting efforts of readers "reading across words"
(Professor Tribe's wonderful phrase' 3 3 ), responding to complex constitutional texts. These indexes would be identifiably responses to the texts
as such (in some way or another). But they might also borrow from other
legal vocabularies and presuppositions, or, indeed, show traces of political culture at large. Indexes may be idiosyncratic. Judges or legislators
or commentators or any other readers could frame organizing vocabularies that were entirely their own. Or recurring indexes might emerge,
cutting across individual constitutional readings, each reiteration
increasing their attraction. Use of particular recurring indexes might
wane as well as wax, of course. But to the extent of their general appeal,
they figure within constitutional law as literal "rules of recognition,"
sources of contingent, but nonetheless real, stability.
130. Neither administrative autonomy nor legislative supremacy would have been fully
realized. Arguably, constitutions often evoke conflicting ideals or models of government without
entirely frustrating realization of either or both of the ideals (Adams was, perhaps, an unusual
case). The two proposals at issue in Smith and Weber, we may think, might have coexisted-some
legislative intervention, but also some space for administrative government. But "some" would
have needed to be delimited somehow in order to maintain uncertainty at tolerable levels-and
"somehow" would not have been (whatever its source) contributed by the Florida Constitution.
131. See Akhil Reed Arnar, Jntratextualism, 112 HARV. L. Rav. 747, 788-91 (1999).
132. LAURENCE H. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 40-47, 70-78 (3rd ed. 2000); See,
e.g., CHARLES L. BLACK, JR., STRUCTURE AND RELATIONSHIP IN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 3-32
(1969).
133. TRIBE, supra note 132, at 40.
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The idea that indexing terms are the work of constitutional readers
supposes that constitutional law-overall-is an effort or enterprise, a

work in progress, an accumulation of sometimes overlapping, sometimes
conflicting, sometimes gapped texts pulled together, however provisionally, by reader efforts that in the aggregate may themselves either coalesce or diverge. Within this picture, criticism singling out indexing
efforts, however harsh, does not put into question the enterprise as 34a
whole: constitutional texts as such are only occasionally denounced.'
Index criticism is commonplace. Marking terms may be too far removed

from textual provisions. Or they may be too narrow, too incomplete.
"Truth is understood as a matter of evidence, rather than a function of

logic.'

35

Perhaps especially in the case of judicial readers (who address

constitutional texts especially closely and especially often), the question

of whether their efforts result in a right proportion of idiosyncratic and
recurring indexes frames a familiar long-standing debate. "Doctrine,"

"principles," "neutral principles," "precedent"-the worries encoded in
labels like these seek to regulate the frequency or impact of heroic or

virtuoso readings (work themselves, therefore, as second-order
indexes). 136 Within the analyses of judges and commentators, legislative
or executive glosses sometimes seem to warrant deference.' 37 Com-

monly, however, deference is limited by indexing terms judges or commentators themselves ordinarily bring to bear to highlight constitutional
emphases, terms which (if perceived to be pertinent) trigger close scrutiny of legislative understandings, scrutiny itself organized by sets of
indexing terms. 138 Whatever else might be concluded, it should be evi134. There are, at present, very few (widely known) critiques (within either federal or state
constitutional law) of a piece with, for example, the abolitionist argument that the Constitution "is
a covenant with death." For discussion of the 1854 Fourth of July rally sponsored by the
Massachusetts Anti-Slavery Society at which William Lloyd Garrison burned a copy of the
Constitution, declaring it to be "a covenant with death, and an agreement with hell," see Donald
Yacovone, "A Covenant with Death and an Agreement with Hell," Massachusetts Historical
Society, Online: Object of the Month (2005), http://www.masshist.org/objects/2005july.cfm. For
recent criticisms of the U.S. Constitution as such, see, e.g., Thurgood Marshall, Commentary:
Reflections on the Bicentennial of the United States Constitution, 101 HARV. L. REV. 1 (1987);
SANFORD LEVINSON, OUR UNDEMOCRATIC CONSTITUTION (2006).
135. Rosalind Krauss, Notes on the Index: Seventies Art in America, Part 2, 4 OCTOBER 58, 66
(1977). 'Th[e] condition of ... having-been-there satisfies questions of verifiability at the level of
the document." Id.
136. See, e.g., CHARLES FRIED, SAYING WHAT THE LAW Is 1-12 (2004); RONALD DWORKIN,
FREEDOM'S LAW 10-11, 104-10 (1996) ("Textual Homes").
137. For the classic argument, see James B. Thayer, The Origin and Scope of the American
Doctrine of ConstitutionalLaw, 7 HARv. L. REv. 129, 143-53 (1893).
138. Compare, e.g., City of Boeme v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507 (1997) (congressional view of
constitutional emphases inconsistent with Supreme Court's-statute unconstitutional), with, e.g.,
Nev. Dep't of Human Res. v. Hibbs, 538 U.S. 721 (2003) (congressional and Supreme Court
identifications of constitutional emphases overlap-statute constitutional). Obvious examples of
such highlighting and scrutiny-fixing indexes in United States constitutional law include, for
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dent that index-work comprises much of the ordinary business of constitutional law.

Some constitutional provisions, within their own wording, set out
indexing terms, and thus themselves organize subsequent reader interpretations. Article II, section 3, of the Florida Constitution declares: "No
person belonging to one branch shall exercise any powers appertaining
to either of the other branches unless expressly provided herein." The
separation of powers idea-in federal law, for example, an index term
propounded by readers reacting to the larger set of constitutional provisions-becomes a conception that itself organizes ("indexes") constitu-

tional interpretation, obligating constitutional interpreters to match
officials with "branches" and branches with "powers" in order to deter-

mine whether official action authorized by a given statute, for example,
in fact fits within the constitutional arrangements. Legislative alterations
of common law rights of action, whether exercises in revision or outright
abolition, could quite plausibly be understood within constitutional law
as a matter to be judged under the heading of separation of powers prior-

ity rules-for example, the familiar rule proclaiming "legislative
supremacy."13' 9 But article I, section 21, includes the requirement that

"[t]he courts shall be open to every person for redress of any injury" in
the Florida Constitution's "Declaration of Rights." Taking this constitutional classification seriously, Florida courts have treated common law
actions as individual rights. 140 Constitutional texts identifying constitutional indexes can also proceed by cross-reference (or renvoi). Thus, the
proposed amendment at issue in Armstrong v. Harris, subsequently
approved by voters, changed article I, section 17, to tie Florida constituexample, Justice Stone's formulas in United States v. Carolene Products Co., 304 U.S. 144, 153
n.4 (1938), and Professor Ely's gloss on United States v. O'Brien, 391 U.S. 367 (1968) see John
Hart Ely, Flag Desecration:A Case Study in the Roles of Categorizationand Balancing in First
Amendment Analysis, 88 HARV. L. REv. 1482 (1975). In Florida constitutional law, one especially
clear illustration may be found in the efforts of Florida judges to develop an "equal protection"
gloss mimicking United States Supreme Court readings of the Fourteenth Amendment for
purposes of enforcing the equality guarantee of the Florida Constitution's article I, section 2. See,
e.g., Shriners Hosps. for Crippled Children v. Zrillic, 563 So. 2d 64, 67-68 (Fla. 1990); Schreiner
v. McKenzie Tank Lines, Inc., 432 So. 2d 567, 569-70 (Fla. 1983).
139.
The legislature, provided it acts within its constitutional authority, is the arbiter of
the public policy of the State. While the court, unaided by legislative declaration
and applying the principles of the common law, may uphold or condemn contracts
in light of what is conceived to be public policy, its determination as a rule for
future action must yield to the legislative will when expressed in accordance with
the organic law.
Chi., Burlington & Quincy R.R. Co. v. McGuire, 219 U.S. 549, 565 (1911). See Roscoe Pound,
Common Law and Legislation, 21 HARv. L. REv. 383, 402-07 (1908).
140. See, e.g., Nationwide Mut. Fire Ins. Co. v. Pinnacle Med., Inc., 753 So. 2d 55, 57-59 (Fla.
2000); Kluger v. White, 281 So. 2d 1, 4 (Fla. 1973).
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tional prohibitions of excessive punishments to United States Supreme
Court understandings of the federal Eighth Amendment. Article I, section 12, as amended, identifies United States Supreme Court readings of
the Fourth Amendment as fixing the interpretive matrix applicable in
cases addressing the Florida constitutional prohibition of unreasonable
searches and seizures. 141
Constitutional amendments may pose problems for the larger enterprise. Individual amendments might, to varying degrees, alter the mix
for indexing purposes-appear to change emphases evident across accumulations of constitutional propositions, and thus revise existing balances of congruences and conflicts. In some cases, amendments could
introduce altogether new elements into constitutional texts, perhaps
prompting reader recognition of new indexes of greater or lesser import.
Ordinarily, changes like these will not disrupt the overall constitutional
enterprise. Particular amendments could pose real difficulties, of
course-the initiative proposal at issue in Adams v. Gunter, is perhaps
illustrative-but the larger problem may lie in aggregation-in the
accumulation of amendments. Too many changes, especially if they
introduce too many new constitutional topics or possible thematic variations suggested by constitutional language, might effectively fragment
the underlying text to the point that indexing efforts become exercises in
futility. Possible starting points could proliferate and also almost immediately run into each other as well. Constitutional Babel-a fear evocative of the end result, it may plausibly seem,42 of the huge number of
amendments added to the 1885 Constitution.'
IV.

CONTRA BABEL

Constitutional organization is not necessarily-one or the otherstraightforward or complex (or chaotic, for that matter.) For example,
the article II, section 3, separation of powers mandate is, on its face, a
clear commitment to straightforward organization (every power in its
proper place only.) 143 Still, the Florida Supreme Court recently constructed a notably complex index in the course of cataloging its cases
addressing the judiciallegislative separation of powers:
Of course, statutes at times may not appear to fall exclusively into
either a procedural or substantive classification. We have held that
141. For critical discussion, see Thomas C. Marks, Jr., Federalism and the Florida
Constitution: The Self-inflicted Wounds of Thrown-away Independence From the Control of the
U.S. Supreme Court, 66 ALB. L. Rav. 701 (2003).
142. See Smathers v. Smith, 338 So.2d 825, 829 n.14 (Fla. 1976).
143. "The powers of the state government shall be divided into legislative, executive and
judicial branches. No person belonging to one branch shall exercise any powers appertaining to

either of the other branches unless expressly provided herein."

FLA. CoNsT.

art. H, § 3.
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where a statute contains some procedural aspects, but those provisions are so intimately intertwined with the substantive rights created
by the statute, that statute will not impermissibly intrude on the practice and procedure of the courts in a constitutional sense ....

How-

ever, where a statute does not basically convey substantive rights, the
procedural aspects of the statute cannot be deemed "incidental," ....
Moreover, where this Court has promulgated rules that relate to practice and procedure, and a statute provides a contrary practice or procedure, the statute is unconstitutional to the extent of the conflict ...
Finally, where a statute has some substantive aspects, but the procedural requirements of the statute conflict with or interfere with the
procedural mechanisms of the court system, those requirements are
unconstitutional. 144
The Court does not preclude the possibility that some separation of powers questions can be treated straightforwardly. 145 But most of its compilation summarizes interplays-quintessentially complex inquiries
simultaneously considering several source materials (e.g., rules of procedure and statutory provisions) and judging competing materials as
against each other.
We might think that something like this heterogeneous mixture of
straightforwardness and complexity describes the working assumptions
and index terms of Florida constitutional law generally-at least as it
stands now. We might also think that cognizance of the organizational
risks posed by increases in complexity, even if not always pressing,
nonetheless ought to be evident and indeed sometimes prominent concerns in the constitutional law of constitutional amendments. We should
see efforts to constrain the multiplication of interplays, or at least to
mark the most pertinent reverberations across constitutional texts as
such; we should also see something similar at the second level, efforts to
manage the proliferation of indexes. Indeed we do, I argue. The question
whether the language of constitutional amendments-indeed, constitutional terms generally-is or is not self-executing makes most sense if it
is understood as testing complexity, as gauging whether a given constitutional text, as understood, interacts in well-defined or ill-defined ways
with other constitutional provisions (or, in some cases, nonconstitutional
legal materials.) The question whether a ballot summary is misleading
turns out to organize inquiry helpfully-rather than simply beg general
questions-if understood as an effort to establish rudiments (at least) of
canonical indices-introductory maps of the principal purposes and
144. Massey v. David, 979 So. 2d 931, 937 (Fla. 2008).
145. See, e.g., Dep't of Children and Families v. K.R., 946 So. 2d 106, 107-08 (Fla. 5th Dist.
Ct. App. 2007); Dep't of Children and Families v. Soliman, 947 So. 2d 568, 570 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct.
App. 2006); State v. Gibson, 935 So. 2d 611, 613 (Fla. 3rd Dist. Ct. App. 2006).
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effects of proposed constitutional changes. Ballot summaries, within this
view, suppose that amendment drafters, voters, and judges are all
engaged in versions of the same interpretive enterprise, caught up in the
common project of making sense of constitutional proposals.
A.

Self-Executing Terms and ConstitutionalComplexity

I begin with genealogy.
1.

46

INTELLECTUAL ORIGINS OF "SUFFICIENT RULE"

Gray v. Bryant appears as though out of nowhere-at least as a
matter of Florida constitutional law.' 47 The court's only citations are to
one Missouri and one Oklahoma decision. 148 The Missouri Supreme
Court was not much concerned with the matter, relying on American
Jurisprudence and Corpus Juris Secondum. 1 49 But the Oklahoma
Supreme Court pointed 5 ° to a United States Supreme Court decision in
1900 in Davis v. Burke addressing the effect of a provision of the Idaho
constitution. 15 ' Burke helps: the opinion there invoked Thomas Cooley's
famous Constitutional Limitations, 52 quoting language that first
appeared in the 1878 edition of the treatise, in a chapter entitled "Of the
1 53
Construction of State Constitutions:
A constitutional provision may be said to be self-executing if it supplies a sufficient rule by means of which the right given may be
enjoyed and protected, or the duty imposed may be enforced; and it is
not self-executing when it merely indicates principles, without laying
down rules by means of which those principles may be given the
force of law.' 5 4
155
Cooley attributes this proposition to no one.
146. For a discussion of the self-executing question as considered by state courts generally, see
Jose L. Fernandez, State Constitutions, EnvironmentalRights Provisions, and the Doctrine of SelfExecution: A Political Question? 17 HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 333, 341-61 (1993).
147. See Gray v. Bryant, 125 So. 2d 846, 851 (Fla. 1960). The phrase "sufficient rule" had
appeared previously, in the context of a discussion of the constitutional division of responsibility
as between the governor and the legislature, see Ex parte White, 178 So. 876, 879 (Fla. 1938), but
Bryant does not note the case.
148. See Gray, 125 So. 2d at 851 (citing State ex rel. Fulton v. Smith, 194 S.W.2d 302 (Mo.
1946); City of Shawnee v. Williamson, 338 P.2d 355 (Okla. 1959)).
149. See Fulton, 194 S.W. 2d at 304.
150. See Shawnee, 338 P.2d at 358.
151. See Davis v. Burke, 179 U.S. 399, 403 (1900).
152. Id.
153. THOMAS COOLEY, CONSTrrtUnONAL LIMrrATnONS 48-103 (4th ed. 1878).
154. Id. at 101. Exparte White, in using the phrase "sufficient rule," quoted another part of the
Cooley treatise. See White, 178 So. at 879.
155. COOLEY, supra note 153, at 48-103. CONSTrruTIONAL LIMrrATIONS is nonetheless not
without predecessors. In a Michigan opinion that Cooley uses as an example, see id. at 100 n. 1, a
constitutional requirement that the legislature "provide an uniform rule of taxation" was declared
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At least at first glance, however, it does not appear to be difficult to
reconstruct his thinking. In an earlier passage, introducing the discussion
of whether constitutional provisions are self-executing, he wrote:
But although all the provisions of a constitution are to be regarded as
mandatory, there are some which, from the nature of the case, are as
incapable of compulsory enforcement as are directory provisions in
general. The reason is that, while the purpose may be to establish
rights or to impose duties, they do not in and of themselves constitute
a sufficient rule by means of which such right may be protected or
such duty enforced. 156
"[I]n and of themselves": Cooley works within the model of straightforward organization. But at other points in his larger discussion of the
"construction of state constitutions,"' 157 in passages that first appeared in
the initial 1868 edition of ConstitutionalLimitations, his formal premise
appears to be different:
Every such instrument is adopted as a whole, and a clause which,
standing by itself, might seem of doubtful import, may yet be made
plain by comparison with other clauses or portions of the same law. It
is therefore a very proper rule of construction, that the whole is to be
examined with a view of arrivingat the true intention of each part.158
to be unenforceable absent implementing legislation: "No new rule of taxation had been provided
by the Legislature when the assessment was made, and it is not pretended that this provision of the
Constitution executes itself." Williams v. Mayor of Detroit, 2 Mich. 560, 565 (1853). Earlier still,
in a case of manifest importance, the United States Supreme Court, deciding Groves v. Slaughter,
40 U.S. 449 (1841), addressed the question of whether a provision of the 1832 Mississippi
constitution (superseding its 1817 predecessor), barring "introduction of slaves into this state as
merchandise, or for sale" was itself legally operative, or rather required implementing legislation
to take effect. See id. at 499-500. The Court's majority held that the amendment was not selfexecuting, analyzing the matter in a way that Cooley's own "sufficient rule" requirement seems to
summarize precisely:
But there is nothing in this provision which looks like withdrawing the whole
subject from the action of the legislature. On the contrary, there is every reason to
believe, from the mere naked prohibition, that it looked to legislative enactments to
carry it into full operation .... Legislative provision is indispensable to carry into
effect the object of this prohibition. It requires the sanction of penalties ....How is
a violation of this prohibition to be punished? ... What would become of the slaves
thus introduced? Will they become free immediately upon their introduction, or do
they become forfeited to the state? These are questions not easily answered.
Id. at 500-01. After the Groves decision, Mississippi courts made clear their own view that the
provision was self-executing. But the federal Supreme Court reasserted its own ruling. See Rowan
v. Runnels, 46 U.S. 134, 139 (1847). For a properly detailed historical account, see Michael P.
Mills, Slave Law in Mississippi From 1817-1861: Constitutions, Codes and Cases, 71 Miss. L.J.
153, 206-11 (2001). For discussion of other pre-Cooley cases, see Fernandez, supra note 146, at
335-38.
156. COOLEY, supra note 157, at 99.
157. Id. at 48.
158. Id. at 70 (emphasis in original). The passage appears at page 57 in the first edition.
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Something like complex organization now appears to be the
assumption:
One part may qualify another so as to restrict its operation, or apply it
otherwise than the natural construction would require if it stood by
itself; but one part is not to be allowed to defeat another, if by any
reasonable construction the two can be made to stand together.' 5 9
But here too Cooley also recognizes the possibility of straightforward
organization-albeit as exception seemingly, rather than rule:
It is a general rule, in the construction of writings, that, a general
intent appearing, it shall control the particular intent; but this rule
must sometimes give way, and effect must be given to a particular
apparintent plainly expressed in one part of a constitution, though
16
ently opposed to a general intent deduced from other parts.'
Cooley oscillates.
2.

"SUFFICIENT RULE" GIVEN COMPLEXITY

What would "sufficient rule" look like if we took seriously ideas of
complex organization in some respect after the fashion of at least some
of Thomas Cooley's 1868 formulations? If constitutional organization is
understood, often anyway, to be complex (or potentially so), the "sufficient rule" inquiry must encompass more than the provision immediately
at hand. The question of whether terms are self-executing may turn in
important part on the implications of other constitutional declarations
that appear to be conceptually adjacent-in effect, index across these
other declarations as well. 16 The initially pertinent provision ought to
be considered as accommodating the suppositions of its cousins
(checked to determine whether this was indeed the case). This inquiry,
as one result, may test whether enough added working material therefore
accumulates to meet the "sufficient rule" demand.
This does not mean, it is important to note, that the content of the
constitutional language whose "sufficiency" is put in issue therefore
becomes-taken in isolation-the point of reference for purposes of
identifying other, perhaps relevant provisions. The "self-executing"
question is, at bottom, the question of whether a constitutional provision
159. Id. at 71 (page 58 n.3 in first edition).
160. Id. at 71 n.4.
interpretation are derived from the
161. "[M]any of the important values that drive ...
Constitution, broadly understood." Philip P. Frickey, Interpretation on the Borderline:
Constitution, Canons, Direct Democracy, 1996 ANN. SURV. AM. L. 477, 499. In some instances a
constitutional amendment itself identifies pertinent additional interpretive resources-for
example, if the amendment, like the amendment at issue in Armstrong v. Harris, directs courts to
use federal understandings of cognate federal constitutional provisions. See 773 So. 2d 7 (Fla.

2000).
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is capable of use by judges in the absence of legislative gloss. Does the
provision afford adequate support for a cause of action, an adequate
basis for resolving the issues that judicial action itself treats as the
framework within which it proceeds? There are, it turns out, also generally helpful constitutional backdrops: two overlapping provisions of the
Florida Constitution work to structure judicial perspective and thus sug62
gest pertinent considerations-interpretive starting points, at least.
a.

Access to courts

Article I, section 21, safeguards the ordinary availability of common law rights of action.' 6 3 But the access to courts right, as the Florida
Supreme Court understands it, does not absolutely protect common law
actions from statutory change: legislators may replace actions with alternate remedies or abolish actions outright in cases of public need." 6
Moreover, common law actions are, within their own terms, fully capa-

ble of enforcing statutory norms-or validating recognition of implicit
statutory rights of action sufficiently similar in concept to common law
actions.' 65 Constitutional provisions can also fall within common law
reach.' 6 6 Vis-A-vis constitutional provisions-the matter at hand herethe structure of access to courts analysis therefore suggests rules of construction: Whether or not constitutional terms are consistent with judicial enforcement organized along common law lines turns not just on
"aptness" analyzed at large (as it were), but on whether constitutional
162. I am supposing, of course, that a provision that is the immediate focus does not declare
itself to be constitutionally exclusive-to preempt consideration in any way of any other
constitutional provisions.
163. See FLA. CoNsT. art. I, § 21. Section 21 also addresses pre-1968 statutory rights of action.
For present purposes, I subsume these statutory actions within the term "common law."
164. See, e.g., Warren v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 899 So. 2d 1090, 1096-97 (Fla.
2005); Kluger v. White, 281 So. 2d 1, 4 (Fla. 1973).
165. See, e.g., Fla. Dep't. of Envtl. Prot. v. Contractpoint Fla. Parks, 986 So. 2d 1260, 1269 n.9
(Fla. 2008) (contract action); Pan-Am Tobacco Corp. v. Dep't of Corrs., 471 So. 2d 4, 4 (Fla.
1984) (same); Mostoufi v. Presto Food Stores, Inc., 618 So. 2d 1372, 1377 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App.
1993) (pollution clean up action); Gatwood v. McGee, 475 So. 2d 720, 723 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App.
1985) (negligence action). Whether statutory schemes are amenable to enforcement through
common law actions may also be determined, of course, by considering whether aspects of the
schemes themselves are inconsistent with litigative enforcement. See, e.g., Fischer v. Metcalf, 543
So. 2d 785, 788, 790 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1989). Analysis of statutory fights of actionostensibly entirely independent of common law actions--often draw on common-law actions as
models in gauging the significance of statutory complexity. For an especially clear and well
worked out example, juxtaposing tort conclusions regarding duty and intricate statutory reading,
see Horowitz v. Plantation General Hospital, 959 So. 2d 176 (Fla. 2007).
166. Inverse condemnation actions are illustrative. See, e.g., S. Fla. Water Mgmt. Dist. v.
Basore of Fla., Inc., 723 So. 2d 287, 288 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1998), rev. denied, 740 So. 2d
527 (Fla. 1999). See also Sch. Bd. v. King, 940 So. 2d 593, 601-03 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 2006)
(delimiting right of action enforcing "adequate provision" requirement of FLA. CONST. art. IX,
§ l(legislative funding of public schools)).
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terms point to alternate enforcement means or suggest reasons why common law actions would-within the given setting-be problematic. The
same structure of analysis also suggests, obviously, that the mere possibility that the Florida Legislature might fashion alternate enforcement

mechanisms, litigative or otherwise, is not in and of itself reason to treat
a constitutional provision as not self-executing. This possibility lies in
the background with regard to all rights enforced through common law

actions.
Article I, section 21, it should be apparent, does not give constitu-

tional status as such to common law rights, but instead fixes a duty of
due regard. These seem to be the suppositions: Common law rights of
action are understood to identify interests which, at the time the actions
were first acknowledged by courts, were thought to be in need of a particular, particularly express form of legal protection-judicial process
and remedies. It may be that other, cross-cutting interests will later matter more, defining new legal agendas of concern. Article I, section 21,
requires that new legislative arrangements understandably address this
conflict. 6 7 Changes must be capable of defense both within the new
terms-as responses to the new concerns-but also within or at least
vis-A-vis the former agenda-as either arrangements which continue to
take seriously (albeit in different ways) the interests furthered previously, or as express judgments of relative priority.
b.

Florida due process of law

Article I, section 9, limits legislative discretion to restrict common
law defenses. 16 8 "Procedural due process ...requires that a defendant be
able to rebut a statutory presumption." 169 Assertions like this recur
167. See Kluger, 281 So. 2d at 4. Common-law recognition of substitutes for common-law
actions--e.g., enforcement of contractual agreements to arbitrate claims in lieu of litigation-also
entail a "due regard" inquiry: judicial consideration of public policy, bargaining dynamics
(unconscionability), and consideration. See Global Travel Mktg., Inc. v. Shea, 908 So. 2d 392, 398
(Fla. 2005).
168. See FLA. CONST. art. I, § 9. Because article I, section 21, fixes a legislative duty of due
regard, it becomes apparent why this constitutional provision narrowly focuses on restrictions of
rights of action as such and not affirmative defenses and the like. Defenses are not, we can see,
unequivocally "affirmative" (except as a matter of pleading rules). See FLA. CoNsT. art. I, § 21.
They do not necessarily mark judicial or legislative commitments to protect certain interests,
perhaps replacing or revising earlier commitments, but may merely fix limits of legal protection
for the interests a right of action safeguards. Removing initial limits on a right of action, it
appears, is therefore akin to recognizing a new right of action altogether. Judicial or legislative
protection is extended, not withdrawn. Changes of this latter sort may still be constitutionally
problematic. But they must be made to seem so set against a different backdrop, constitutional
provisions other than the access to courts guarantee.
169. Agency for Health Care Admin. v. Associated Indus. of Fla., Inc., 678 So. 2d 1239, 1254
(Fla. 1996). The Florida Supreme Court held, in this case, that Florida government could not bring
suit to recoup Medicare benefits from third parties responsible for the illness or injury of Medicare
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within Florida constitutional law. "[T]here must be a right to rebut in a
fair manner. '"'7 This is too terse, of course. The most telling cases, it
appears, are assembled in Campbell v. Skinner Manufacturing Co. 7 '
Campbell and the decisions to which it points-running as far back as
Chief Justice Marshall's opinion in Tayloe v. Riggs1 -are all versions
of "lost instruments" cases, in which parties seek to substitute copies or
testimony for missing judgments, deeds, contracts, or the like.17 3 The
opinions are notable in several respects. None purports to deny-indeed,
all emphasize-that the documents allegedly lost are supposed to be, as
a matter of law, decisive: absent these documents, plaintiffs have no
grounds for proceeding.' 74 But in each case-whatever the outcome in
view of particular facts-the presumption is understood to be rebuttable.17 5 Plaintiffs are afforded the opportunity to aver that needed documents are lost and prove, through witness testimony or the like, the
pertinent content of the instruments.' 7 6 "[L]etting the party in to prove
77
the justice of the cause" is "important."'
The lost documents cases-generalized-suggest that the theory of
"justice" that underpins the due process "right to rebut" is another version of the idea of due regard that also implicitly informs the Florida
recipients unless the government could identify individual recipients--even if recipients were so
numerous as to make individual identification impractical, and notwithstanding a statutory
provision excusing individual identification in such circumstances. Id. The Florida Legislature,
moreover, could not authorize the state government to seek recovery from third parties on the
basis of market share proof of causation and also seek judgments holding the same third parties
jointly and severally liable. Id. at 1255-56. See also Rollins, Inc. v. Butland, 951 So. 2d 860,
873-75 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 2006) ("pattern and practice" proof of statutory violation in class
action inconsistent with due process because of denial of opportunity to defend as against
individual class members).
170. Straughn v. K & K Land Mgmnt., Inc., 326 So. 2d 421, 424 (Fla. 1976), quoted in
Associated Indus., 678 So. 2d at 1254. Straughn cites two Florida Supreme Court decisions dating
from 1911 and 1919: Goldstein v. Maloney, 57 So. 342, 344 (Fla. 1911); Black v. State, 81 So.
411, 413 (Pa.1919).
171. 43 So. 874 (Fla. 1907), cited in Goldstein, 57 So. at344.
172. 26 U.S. 591 (1828).
173. Campbell, 43 So. at 877 (missing deeds case), cites Fries v. Griffin, 17 So. 66, 68 (Fla.
1895) (lost deed), and Edwards v. Rives, 17 So. 416, 418 (Fla. 1895) (missing contract), each of
which relies upon Tayloe, 26 U.S. at 592 (missing contract).
174. "This not being an action for deceit and imposition, but on a written contract, the right of
the plaintiff to recover is measured precisely by that contract ...." Tayloe, 26 U.S. at 598.
175. "A due regard to individual rights, as well as sound policy, requires that in cases of the
establishment of lost instruments the proof as to the contents, or the substance of the contents, of
the operative parts of such instruments should be clear and satisfactory." Fries, 17 So. at 68.
176. "All of the instruments sought to be re-established belonged to that class known as
'ancient instruments or documents,' and to require the principles of evidence to be applied with
technical nicety in such cases would oftentimes not only work great hardship, but would defeat the
ends of justice." Campbell, 43 So. at 877.
177. Tayloe, 26 U.S. at 597.
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constitutional right of access to courts. 7 8 Changes in legal arrangements
178. In the two decisions cited in Straughn v. K & K Land Management, Inc., 326 So. 2d 421,
424 (Fla. 1976), Justice Whitfield also points to then-recent due process opinions of the United
States Supreme Court that underscore, it appears, the message of the lost documents cases. See
Goldstein v. Maloney, 57 So. 342 (Fla. 1911); Black v. State, 81 So. 411 (Fla. 1919)
Justice Whitfield's own formulations borrow in compressed fashion from language included
in the United States Supreme Court opinion in Mobile, Jackson & Kansas City Railroad Co. v.
Turnipseed:
That a legislative presumption of one fact from evidence of another may not
constitute a denial of due process of law or a denial of the equal protection of the
law it is only essential that there shall be some rational connection between the fact
proved and the ultimate fact presumed, and that the inference of one fact from proof
of another shall not be so unreasonable as to be a purely arbitrary mandate. So, also,
it must not, under guise of regulating the presentation of evidence, operate to
preclude the party from the right to present his defense to the main fact thus
presumed.
If a legislative provision not unreasonable in itself, prescribing a rule of evidence, in
either criminal or civil cases, does not shut out from the party affected a reasonable
opportunity to submit to the jury in his defense all of the facts bearing upon the
issue, there is no ground for holding that due process of law has been denied him.
219 U.S. 35, 43 (1910). Who determines what is "the main fact" or "all of the facts bearing upon
the issue"? In a case like Turnipseed itself, in which the statutory presumption addressed an
element in the already well-developed common law negligence action, there might not be much
difficulty. But how would analysis proceed regarding a presumption inserted into an entirely
statutory proceeding? Seemingly cognizant of the question, Whitfield also noted Luria v. United
States, 231 U.S. 9 (1913), addressing the constitutionality of a congressionally enacted
presumption that an individual obtained naturalization without the requisite intention to reside
permanently in the United States if that individual thereafter established permanent residence in a
foreign country within five years of the date of naturalization. In Luria the United States Supreme
Court was plainly troubled. "No doubt, the reason for the presumption lessens as the period of
time between the two events is lengthened." Id. at 27. Before upholding the presumption the Court
construed it in terms substantially minimizing its effect. See id.
The presumption at issue in Bailey v. Alabama, 219 U.S. 219 (1911), cited in Luria, 231 U.S.
at 26, provoked outright federal invalidation. An Alabama statute declared that an employee who
quit work without repaying money owed or performing all services promised would be deemed to
have intentionally and fraudulently breached a contract and therefore have committed a criminal
act if the employee acted without cause. See Bailey, 219 U.S. at 227-28. In addition, Alabama
courts had held, as "a rule of evidence," that a defendant could not rebut the statutory presumption
by testifying "'as to his uncommunicated motives, purpose, or intention.' Id. at 228 (quoting
Bailey v. State, 49 So. 886 (Ala. 1909)). Justice Hughes, writing for a majority of the United
States Supreme Court, described the resulting legal environment, as "the accused" confronted it:
If, at the outset, nothing took place but the making of the contract and the receipt of
the money [given as payment in advance], he could show nothing else. If there was
no legal justification for his leaving his employment, he could show none. If he had
not paid the debt, there was nothing to be said as to that. The law of the state did not
permit him to testify that he did not intend to injure or defraud. Unless he were
fortunate enough to be able to command evidence of circumstances affirmatively
showing good faith, he was helpless. He stood, stripped by the statute of the
presumption of innocence ....
Bailey, 219 U.S. at 236. Hughes was, plainly enough, using as his template the Turnipseed
warning that statutory presumptions should not "preclude" a party from presenting "his defense to
the main fact . . . presumed." Indeed, he quoted Turnipseed a few paragraphs later. See id. at
238-39.
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must acknowledge the interests of adversely affected individuals, conceived as either potential plaintiffs or defendants. This does not mean
that these interests must be straightforwardly accommodated-there
may be overriding concerns. Rearrangements manifesting casual disregard, however, become constitutionally suspect or otherwise interpretively dubious.' 7 9
c.

The interpretive expectation

These propositions, it is easy to conclude, extend to define a stricture-itself constitutionally developed-addressing drafters and interpreters of constitutional amendments, at least if such amendments would
have immediate effect and unless the amendments themselves limit the
applicability of access to courts and due process norms. Due regard
becomes a basic interpretive norm-a default option, as it were-structuring causes of action: itself a commitment sounding in complexity,
recognizing (requiring recognition of) interactions of affected interests.
Judicial efforts to read amendments as or as not self-executing bring this
duty to bear. Amendments framed expressly in terms that supply judicially-obvious intermediate premises-for example, terms plainly making use of common law back-and-forth-would be careful, in the sense
in which judges define care: legal acknowledgement of competing considerations."' 0 Amendments with terms that do not readily fit this form
would require legislative implementation; legislative attention itself,
however, would also itself require acknowledgement of access to courts
and due process implications. The access to courts idea-along with the
due process right to rebut idea-serve as indexes-as organizing biases
structuring reading of a given constitutional provision (or implementing
statute.) If modes of action are readily conceivable through considera179. See, e.g., N. Miami Med. Ctr. v. Miller, 896 So. 2d 886, 890 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 2005).
180. Article VII, section 3(a), of the Florida Constitution declares that "All property owned by
a municipality and used exclusively by it for municipal or public purposes shall be exempt from
taxation. " FLA. CONST. art. VII, § 3(a). In City of Sarasota v. Mikos, 374 So. 2d 458, 460 (Fla.
1979), the Florida Supreme Court held that this provision was self-executing and that, contrary to
legislative definition, "used" included simply holding property for subsequent municipal
undertakings. "[Viacant land held by a municipality is presumed to be in use for a public purpose
if it is not actually in use for a private purpose on tax assessment day." Id. Usual notions of
property law-emphasizing title, possession, and the like-are plainly put to work. Ownership, is
ordinarily consistent with simply "holding"-indeed "holdings" is another word for ownership.
The Florida Supreme Court did not therefore rule inconsistently in Florida Department of
Revenue v. City of Gainesville, 918 So. 2d 250 (Fla. 2005), concluding that, on particular facts,
constitutional "municipal or public purposes" might not be served by a city's operation of a fiberoptic network providing service, inter alia, to private customers. Id. at 253. This was a different,
no longer common-law property question that the court addressed (continuing to treat article VII,
section 3(a) as self-executing) through consideration of long-established constitutional law
vocabularies evoked in both constitutional texts and prior judicial opinions.
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tion of common law actions or analogs, or if responses are suggested by
the same analogies, they ought to be understood to be concomitants of
the provision, fit within the larger constitutional grouping, at least absent
express conflicting language.
d.

Some examples

Three cases illustrate how complex analysis of the "self-executing"
question might work. The discussions that follow do not pretend to be
definitive accounts-but they do try to identify the sorts of questions
that attention to complexity might highlight.
St. John Medical Plans,Inc. v. Gutman' addressed parts of article
II, section 8-Governor Askew's "Ethics in Government" amendment at
issue in Weber v. Smathers.' 82 This was the language at issue:
A public office is a public trust. The people shall have the right to
secure and sustain that trust against abuse.
(c) Any public officer or employee who breaches the public trust
for private gain and any person or entity inducing such breach shall
be liable to the state for all financial benefits obtained by such
actions. The manner of recovery and additional damages may be provided by law.' 83
The phrase "shall be liable" certainly seems, standing alone, to suppose
that the constitutional language is itself legally operative. The initial use
of the term "public trust" marks the matter at hand as concerning fiduciary duty and the later references to "private gain" and "financial benefits" further specify the remedial focus in restitutionary terms, evoking
the familiar idea of unjust enrichment. Gutman addressed a suit brought
18 4
against a state senator allegedly paid "an inappropriate $500,000 fee."'
If the state had initiated the action against Senator Gutman, a strong case
might have been made for invoking the amendment directly, framing the
proceeding in familiar common law terms. Even in the face of the failure
of the Florida Legislature to address "[t]he manner of recovery," it8 5certainly seems, common law would have supplied sufficient "law."'1
But Gutman was a private action. The Florida Supreme Court
decided-reasoning in largely conclusory terms-that the constitutional
language was not self-executing.' 8 6 At first glance, it appears possible to
argue otherwise. Perhaps "the right" of the "people .. .to secure and
181.
182.
183.
184.
185.

721 So. 2d 717, 718-19 (Fla. 1998).
See discussion supra Part II. B.
FLA. CONST. art. II § 8.
Gutman, 721 So. 2d at 718.
Id. at 719.

186. See id. at 719-20.
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sustain" "a public trust" implies a right, exercisable by any individual
members of "[t]he people" to appear in court as trustees to enforce the
trust. "8' 7 Trustees do not recover in their own name; even so, common
law courts are well able to fashion remedies assigning recovered funds
properly. Common law trusteeship, however, supposes some sort of
well-defined way to specify trustees. Trustees are fiduciaries-charged
with appreciating competing interests, acting with care, and obliged to
neutrality. Trusteeship, we might think, is precisely a legal personification of complexity. Public volunteers in cases like Gutman would
neither have become trustees through contract negotiation nor through
judicial appointment. It would seem therefore that-as the Florida
Supreme Court declared-legislative action was indeed necessary-at
least to fix a considered process through which individuals could qualify
as public trustees.
The 1996 Amendment 5 (Everglades) advisory opinion, 188 at least
in retrospect, may be read from the access to courts perspective as implicating a question akin to that posed in Gutman. The central sentence in
article H, section 7(b) announces that "[t]hose ...who cause water pollution . . . shall be primarily responsible for paying the costs of the
abatement of that pollution." '8 9 Requesting the opinion, Governor Chiles
seemed to treat the phrase "primarily responsible" as the "unclear language" chiefly frustrating direct enforcement of the constitutional
requirement.' 90 As I noted earlier, however, the Florida Supreme Court
drafted a definition: "individual polluters, while not bearing the total
burden, would bear their share of the costs of abating the pollution found
to be attributable to them."' 19 1 It is easy to see, moreover, that the court,
in the course of accumulating dictionary readings, 92 fixed its formula in
terms plainly of a piece with the Florida common law commitment to
comparative fault.1 93 "[W]hile polluters . . .must pay for 100% of the
cost to abate the pollution they cause, Amendment 5 does not require
them to pay for the abatement of such portion of the pollution they do
not cause."' 1 9 4 Even so, the Court insisted, section 7(b) was not selfexecuting: "Amendment 5 raises a number of questions such as what
constitutes 'water pollution'; how will one be adjudged a polluter; how
will the cost of pollution abatement be assessed; and by whom might
187. See id. at 718.
188. In re 1996 Amendment 5 (Everglades), 706 So. 2d 278 (Fla. 1997).
189. FLA. CONST. art. II, § 7(b).
190. See id. at 280.
191. Id. at 283.
192. See id. at 282.
193. See Hoffman v. Jones, 280 So. 2d 431, 438 (Fla. 1973).
194. Amendment 5 (Everglades), 706 So. 2d at 283 n.12.
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such a claim be asserted."' 95
The last question-standing-is the crucial one here. (Everglades
in this respect resembles Gutman.) As Governor Chiles had noted, the
South Florida Water Management District and the Department of Environmental Protection were "the governmental entities charged with
enforcing . . . Everglades pollution abatement initiatives." 196 The legal
instruments establishing these entities provided for administrative
enforcement regimes, subject to usual forms of judicial review. 197 Presumably, the appropriate public officials were therefore in position to
determine and levy abatement charges and to sue. Does it therefore follow that individuals-charged with fees, for example-could bring
independent actions in Florida courts invoking the constitutional
formula in order to challenge the fees? In 2002, the Florida Supreme
Court concluded that the Everglades amendment precisely failed to
address this question. "The lack of guiding principles in [the amendment] concerning this division of responsibility is precisely why we held
that legislative action was needed."' 98 Article I, section 21, becomes
irrelevant in this setting. The issue was not whether a common law
action might be capable of enforcing the amendment-rather, the anterior question whether or not the jurisdiction of pertinent government
entities precludes addressing what in substance common law actions
might or might not encompass. 199
Due process of law might remain suggestive, however. If individuals refused to pay Everglades related fees at a point when the Florida
Legislature had made no effort whatsoever to devise a formula identifying the responsibility of polluters, would they have no chance to defend
their refusal by invoking the Everglades amendment simply because the
Florida Legislature had not adopted implementing legislation? "We
believe the voters adopted Amendment 5 to effect a change," the
Supreme Court asserted-"no change" would "nullify the Amendment,
and frustrate the will of the people." 2" Given the "lost documents" cases
and the right to rebut they recognize, should not defendants have the
opportunity to try to show what "share of the costs of abating the pollu195. Id. at 281. The Florida Supreme Court also put forward its in pari materia argument, see
id., that I criticized earlier. See discussion supra Part I.
196. Amendment 5 (Everglades), 706 So. 2d at 280.

197. See, e.g., Ass'n of Fla. Cmty. Developers v. Dep't of Envtl. Prot., 943 So. 2d 989 (Fla. 1st
Dist. Ct. App. 2006); Webster v. S. Fla. Water Mgmt. Dist., 367 So. 2d 734 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct.
App. 1979).
198. Barley v. S. Fla. Water Mgmt. Dist., 823 So. 2d 73, 83 (Fla. 2002).
199. See generally Richard B. Stewart & Cass R. Sunstein, Public Programs and Private
Rights, 95 HARV. L. REv. 1193 (1982); Louis L. Jaffe, The Public Right Dogma in Labor Board
Cases, 59 HARV. L. REv. 720 (1946).
200. Amendment 5 (Everglades), 706 So. 2d at 282.
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tion" Everglades polluters would bear? 2° ' The constitutional amendment
would be understood as authorizing judicial recognition of a defense in
the particular case in no way abridging the legislative authority to fix a
general formula-just as the lost documents cases did not deny legislative power to require proper papers in general. Of course, if individuals
could raise the defense, it is hard to see why they could not assert their
defense preemptively, as it were, in an advance declaratory proceeding.
Buster is also not without difficulties. The Florida Supreme Court's
terse opinion noted that the "[p]atients' right to know" amendment (article X, section 25) treated the right of access to medical records that it
defined and protected as not only substantive but as also "encompass[ing] current document production procedures.., provided 'by general law.' "202 The possibility that the amendment's own definitions
might leave open "a number of relevant and unanswered questions" did
not preclude concluding that the amendment supplied a "sufficient
rule"-rather, merely raised the possibility that "the amendment could
be supplemented by legislation. '2°3 The court also held, however, that
the initial legislative response was unconstitutional in important respects
limited the
because, in several of its sections, the statute "substantially
' 2°
amendment.
the
to
pursuant
granted
right of access
At least in part, the inconsistency of the implementing statute
appeared to be so unambiguous, we may think, because the Buster opinion had already concluded that the earlier legislative limits, in place
prior to ratification, protected no confidentiality interests rising to the
level of "vested rights. '2 5 There was no due process reason to read the
amendment as open to cautious glossing. Does this make sense? The
amendment is self-executing, and also open to legislative gloss-albeit
not to address questions of fairness? What constraints would article X,
section 25 set on judicial interpretations and applications of "current
document production procedures"-discovery is, after all, principally
judicial business? If the new constitutional language is (as the Florida
Supreme Court suggested) simply a statutory repeal, it might be possible
to argue that the amendment implicitly acknowledges that the principal
limit on judicial innovation lies in the Supreme Court's usual interpretation of the separation of powers principle declared in article II, section 3,
characterizing the judicial/legislative divide through elaboration of a
201. Id. at 283.
202. Fla. Hosp. Waterman, Inc. v. Buster, 984 So. 2d 478, 480, 486 (Fla. 2008) (quoting Gray
v. Bryant, 125 So. 2d 846, 852 (Fla. 1960)).
203. Id. at 486.
204. Id. at 492; see id. at 492-93.
205. See id. at 490-92.
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substance/procedure distinction. 0 6 The amendment might therefore be
read as leaving the judiciary alone, at least with respect to the range of
issues ordinarily associated with thinking about pre-trial discovery as
such.
What if, entirely consistently with judicial separation of powers
thinking, the Florida Legislature addressed discovery procedures with
regard to medical errors, prompted not by process concerns, but by substantive worries originating, say, in a view that encouraging proper hospital risk management efforts requires confidentiality protections? If the
amendment itself is substanceless-just a repeal-shouldn't it be read
(to the extent textually possible) as consistent with this sort of legislative
reaction? The legislature could enact confidentiality entitlements not
because of fairness concerns, but as a means to the end of motivating
hospital risk management. If so, article X, section 25, ends up as not
much more than a constitutional reset switch, putting the burden on the
Florida Legislature-once again-to consider the usefulness of confidentiality protections.
B.

Canonical Indexes and Ballot Summary Accuracy

The ballot accuracy question presented in Armstrong v. Harris20 7,
its predecessors, and its successors is best approached obliquely-once
more, I will treat the constitution as complexly organized. I begin by
considering the meaning, the underlying point, of the single subject
requirement limiting the Florida Legislature set out in article I1, section
6. The response that I propose turns on an elaboration of the idea of
"canonical indexes" (a notion that I will try to give some content below).
That idea, it appears, also supplies an opening wedge for reconsidering
the ballot accuracy cases.
1.

THE LEGISLATIVE SINGLE SUBJECT ANALOGY

"Every law shall embrace but one subject and matter properly connected therewith, and the subject shall be briefly expressed in the
title."2 ' This demand, included in Florida constitutions since 1868,2 9 is
plainly concerned with process in some sense. Litigants may raise the
issue only in cases arising before challenged legislative action is codified, within a window therefore always open less than two years.21 0
Reenactment cures the constitutional defect even though codification
206.
207.
208.
209.
210.

See discussion supra Part II.
773 So. 2d 7 (Fla. 2000).
FLA. CONST. art. I1, § 6.
See Gibson v. State, 16 Fla. 291 (1877).
See State v. Johnson, 616 So. 2d 1, 2 (Fla. 1993).
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legislation, we might think, is in substance quintessentially multiple.
The process worry, pretty obviously, must be fair notice. 2 11 Legislation
should make clear what it is that it addresses (codification enactments do
this). The single subject requirement is instrumental, therefore: it works
to make meaningful the accompanying title requirement.
The recent judicial debate about how to give concrete content to the
legislative single subject requirement emphasizes precisely the several
dimensions of the fair notice objective. In State v. Franklin,2 12 Chief
Judge Schwartz, writing for a majority of the Third District Court of
Appeal sitting en banc, upheld an omnibus enactment concerned mostly
with criminal sentences but also-in one instance-the substance of
serious crimes. All of the separate parts of the bill were, in light of Florida Supreme Court decisions, "sufficiently related" to the goal of protecting "the public from repeat and serious violent felony offenders. 2 13
Notably Schwartz added an extended dictum:
The issue of whether a multi-section statute violates the "single subject" rule is one of those perplexing legal controversies in which general rules and decisions embracing them may be found, indeed
multiplied, on each side of the particular controversy, . . . and the
result, and the group of cases to be cited in support of it, lies ultimately in the eye of the judicial beholder.2 14
He would have (had he charge of the Florida Supreme Court) put an end
to judicial enforcement of the legislative single subject requirement:
[T]hat . . . the single subject provision affects only the legislators
themselves, leads also to ...the suggestion that that clause is properly subject only to interpretation and enforcement by the legislature
(which frequently engages in just this sort of self-regulation on the
floor) and the governor in making his decision on whether to approve
a particular bill, rather than the courts. Such a holding would vindicate the sound and often discussed but seldom applied principle that
every branch of the government is responsible for the enforcement of
pertinent provisions of the constitution.25
Judge Cope (who would succeed Judge Schwartz as Chief Judge) dis211. See State ex rel. Flink v. Canova, 94 So. 2d 181, 184 (Fla. 1957); Colonial Inv. Co. v.
Nolan, 131 So. 178, 179 (Fla. 1930). Canova mentioned "log rolling" as well as notice concerns.
Flink, 94 So. 2d at 184. Subsequent Florida Supreme Court opinions sometimes give priority to
the logrolling worry. See, e.g., State v. Thompson, 750 So. 2d 643, 646-47 (Fla. 1999). But if
logrolling were an independent concern, subsequent codification should not moot the question of
the initial bill's constitutionality. It makes more sense, plainly, to think of logrolling as a
legislative possibility giving rise to the fair notice apprehension.
212. 836 So. 2d 1112 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 2003) (en banc), afjfd, 887 So. 2d 1063 (Fla.

2004).
213. Franklin, 836 So. 2d at 1113.
214. Id.
215. Id. at 1114 n.4 (emphasis in original).
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rooted in the lansented. Cope identified "a simple method of analysis"
21 6
itself:
requirement
constitutional
guage of the
The key to single subject analysis is that the Legislature must state
the single subject in the title. It is the Legislature's responsibility to
say what the single subject is. Where a single subject challenge is
raised, the judiciary's sole role is to find the legislatively-stated single subject2 and
determine whether it covers the contents of the legis17
Act.
lative
The approaches proposed by the two Chief Judges are, we can see,
brilliant. Schwartz recast judicious retreat as affirmative adjudicationas an injunction to legislative and gubernatorial responsibility. Cope recognized that legislative compliance with the constitutional titling
requirement relieves judges of the need to identify the relevant statutory
subject and therefore opens a way for close judicial scrutiny of statutory
coherence-scrutiny that, as it figured in his opinion, need not employ
any special vocabulary since it purports to check a prior legislative
determination and thus may proceed, ostensibly minimally, in ordinary
language terms. 2 18 Reviewing the third district decision, the Florida
Supreme Court, dividing 4-3, eschewed brilliance (it may seem). Chief
Justice Pariente's majority opinion passed over Judge Schwartz' suggestion. Pariente did initially adopt Judge Cope's focus on the legislativelyspecified short title. But she also worried about instances in which the
legislature proffered an utterly bland, entirely broad formula, andplainly inconsistently with Cope's proposal-treated the analysis of
coherence as inviting an open-ended, swamping consideration of "the
citation name, the full title, the preamble, and the provisions in the body
of the act," and also (if necessary) "the history of the legislative process."2 19 "There is no bright line rule .. .. 22o Justice Quince, although
dissenting, argued similarly. Analysis required finding "the true subject," which might or might not be "expressed in the title."2 2 '
216. Id. at 1116 (Cope, J., dissenting) (emphasis omitted); see discussion supra note 11 and

accompanying text.
217. Franklin, 836 So. 2d at 1116 (Cope, J., dissenting).
218. Both approaches, it should be noted, required important preliminary work. It was not only
necessary for Judge Schwartz to show the confused state of judicial thinking about the single
subject requirement; he also needed to demonstrate how frequently single subject inquiries
involved consideration of statutory provisions substantively irrelevant to the immediate facts of
the case at hand. Judge Cope was obliged to work through several possible candidate titles
presented on the face of a statute-the long title (essentially naming every part), the short title (the
initial summarizing phrase following the enacting formula), and (in some instances) the popular
name legislatively-assigned to a statute. Cope concluded that the language of the constitutional
titling requirement itself marked the short title as the pertinent one.
219. Id. at 1077-78.
220. Id. at 1079.
221. Id. at 1086 (Quince, J., dissenting).
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Why did Chief Justice Pariente augment and in the process undercut Judge Cope's analysis? Cope agreed with Judge Schwartz that the
proper perspective from which to appreciate the single subject requirement was legislative, and that the proper role of the judiciary, in this
instance, was to hold the Florida Legislature to its constitutional dutyto assure itself fair notice. Disagreement concerned only the means to
the common end. Pretty obviously, Pariente (and also Justice Quince)
did not start with the idea of a distinctive legislative perspective. Legislative drafters can hardly be expected to monitor closely all parts of a
bill and also its legislative history, at least in cases (the cases most likely
to raise the single subject issue) in which the content of legislation is a
work in progress. Platonic attention to "the true subject" also seems
unlikely in this context. The Florida Supreme Court, it appears, instead
adopted the point of view of readers rather than writers of legislation.
The Justices wrote as they read, in other words, as judges or, more democratically, as skeptically attentive legal readers regardless of office.
Concern for possible legislative titling games, appreciation of the potential usefulness of various legal materials, reservation of the independent
stance-all are of a piece.
But if the fair notice demand underlying the legislative single subject requirement does not originate in the distinctive needs of legislative
process, what is the concern to which it responds, the concern that gives
it content? Consider: Titles index. Legislative titles are readers' guides
to what (the titles make it appear) matters most in complex legislative
texts.2 2 For purposes of interpreting a legislative enactment in advance
of codification, legislatively-attached titles may serve as an at least thin
substitute for the rich catalog of priorities the surrounding sequence of
codified provisions-including their own sets of section and subsection
headings-often affords readers seeking to assign emphases to the terms
of individual provisions.2 2 3 Titles mark legislative priorities and thus
identify emphases readers should bring to bear in judging the implications of not yet codified enactments. Titles, thus, are not simply

222. It is important to distinguish between titles given bills by legislators as part of the
enactment process and titles inserted by codifiers as part of their editorial work. The latter
efforts-it is well-established-are not legally pertinent. See supra note 219. I use "titles,"
therefore, to refer to legislatively-added titles only.
223. "A heading of a section or subsection of a statute is part of the law and can be used to
glean statutory intent." Vill. of Wellington v. Palm Beach County, 941 So. 2d 595, 600 (Fla. 4th
Dist. Ct. App. 2006), rev. denied, 954 So. 2d 29 (Fla. 2007); see Fajardo v. State, 805 So. 2d 961,
963 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 2001) (citing earlier decisions). For an emphatic concatenation of
illustrations of how, subsequent to codification, the arrangement and substance of surrounding
statutory provisions may be put to use in judicial interpretation of individual enactments, see
Horowitz v. Plantation GeneralHospital, 959 So. 2d 176, 181-86 (Fla. 2007).
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indexes-they are specifications of canonical emphases.22 4 It is this normative mapping, we can see, that explains the inclusion of the single
subject limit alongside the titling requirement. Genuinely scattershot
legislation, even if accurately titled, would suggest nothing about relative priorities (there would be no relative priorities to suggest) organizing the enacted bill.2 25 Codification makes titular markings often much
less relevant-not necessarily because codifiers substitute their own system of titles (codifiers are administrators and not themselves legislators), 226 but because codifications locate statutory provisions, supply a

substantively adjacent context of other statutory provisions giving content to consistency norms or other interpretive disciplines. We can therefore understand both the purpose and also the short shelf life of the
single subject discipline.
2.

BALLOT SUMMARY ACCURACY

Ballot summary scrutiny might be understood as a variant of the

legislative single subject inquiry-as the Florida Supreme Court has
itself recently noted.2 27 The summary, within the terms that I have
developed here, identifies canonical emphases-selects from the accumulated terms included in a proposed amendment primary elements to
be taken seriously in processes of interpretation.22 8 Interpretation is in
224. "Canonicity is not a property of the work itself but of its transmission, its relation to other
GUILLORY, CULTURAL CAPITAL 55 (1993). I use the
term "canon" here in its literary sense, and not in the sense, for example, of the familiar idea of
"canons of construction." For this latter use, in especially sophisticated fashion, in the context of
interpretation of constitutional amendments, see Frickey, supra note 161, at 504-26.
225. State v. Thompson, 750 So. 2d 643 (Fla. 1999), supplies an especially obvious example:
The legislation there was largely concerned with criminal law sentences and procedures in
connection with prosecution of violent criminals. See id. at 647. But two sections of the bill
provided (1) a civil cause of action for damages in cases of violation of injunctions protecting
against domestic violence; and (2) another civil action-for both compensatory and punitive
damages-in cases of continued domestic violence. See id. Although all parts of the bill were
concerned with violent acts, it is not difficult to argue that the legal contexts within which the
criminal law changes and the civil action additions would need to be assessed are plainly
substantially different.
226. On codifiers as administrators and their titling as persuasive only, see State v. Bradford,
787 So. 2d 811, 818-19 (Fla. 2001), and State v. Bussey, 463 So. 2d 1141, 1143 (Fla. 1985). See
also FLA. CONST. art. X, § 12(h) ("Titles and subtitles shall not be used in construction").
227. See Fla. Dep't of State v. Slough, 992 So. 2d 142, 148-49 (Fla. 2008).
228. Constitutions in South Africa, India, and a few other states incorporate "directive
principles" as "guides," in particular instances "a point of reference" or "interpretation tool." Dirk
Brand, The Western Cape ProvincialConstitution, 31 RUTGERS L.J. 961, 970 (2000); see G. Alan
Tarr & Robert F. Williams, Foreword: Getting From Here to There: Twenty-First Century
Mechanisms and Opportunities in State Constitutional Reform, 36 RuTGERS L.J. 1075, 1119-20
(2005) (discussing possible applicability in U.S. state constitutional settings). It is not clear
whether consideration of these principles is a mandatory part of interpretation-and thus strongly
canonical-or rather, whether consideration is presumptively proper if undertaken (weakly

works in a collocation of works .... " JOHN
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important part always also installation, presupposing and accomplishing
the necessary work of fitting amendment text within the larger context
of the Florida constitution, indeed Florida law generally. Ballot summaries matter, therefore, because they figure-potentially, anyway-in an
interpretive undertaking that is not only part of the process of voting, but
also encompasses drafting and implementation of constitutional amendments, therefore connecting voting with these other efforts. From this
perspective, Crawford v. Gilchrist and the Armstrong case overlap.22 9
The key question is not whether voters might have-within any given
electoral process-alternative sources of information, but whether a proposed amendment includes legally necessary materials: including, inter
alia, a sufficient specification of how the proposed amendment fits
within the larger set of pertinent legal materials. Accordingly, a summary becomes misleading if it fails to mention or mischaracterizes parts
of a proposed amendment that in fact plainly, substantially change Florida law-or alternatively, misleadingly presents parts that in fact leave
Florida law unchanged.2 3 °
a.

As applied

Armstrong v. Harris itself fits readily within this account. The ballot language there failed to mark adoption of ihe federal understanding
of cruel and unusual punishment as working a significant change in
Florida law.2 31 Recent ballot summary decisions, moreover, frequently
pick out summary elements plainly central to interpretive efforts generally-including but extending beyond the voting decision. Thus, an
acceptable summary must "clearly state[ ] the chief purpose of the measure .. .
Insistence on statement of purpose might at first appear to
be unexceptionable and thus unrevealing-but the literal language of an
amendment might not declare its purpose in so many words, and thus
one sort of summary at least (a fair copy, as it were) would not either.
But purpose as such matters much precisely if the ballot summary is
itself a relatively autonomous legal document, assigned its own distinct
task: indexing-orienting or organizing voters or judges or administracanonical.) Within a regime that acknowledges the possibility of multiple indexing schemes, weak
canonicity may itself suffice to establish the preeminence of canonical indexes.
229. Regarding Crawford v. Gilchrist, see dicussion supra pp. 19-22.
230. See, e.g., In re 1.35% Property Tax Cap, 2 So. 3d 968, 975-76 (Fla. 2009); Slough, 992
So. 2d at 148-49; In re Fla. Minimum Wage Amendment, 880 So. 2d 636, 641-43 (Fla. 2004).
Express acknowledgement that a proposal substantially changes Florida law is not necessary if the
summary of the proposed amendment's own terms plainly implies the change. E.g., In re Health
Hazards of Second-hand Smoke, 814 So. 2d 415, 418-19 (Fla. 2002).
231. Accord In re Treating People Differently Based on Race, 778 So. 2d 888, 898 (Fla. 2000);
In re People's Prop. Rights, 699 So. 2d 1304, 1308-09, 1311 (Fla. 1997).
232. Health Hazards of Second-hand Smoke, 814 So. 2d at 419.
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The interpretive point of view is espe-

cially obvious in cases dealing with problems posed by definitions.
Proposed constitutional language occasionally includes broad wordings
that drafters leave undefined; in other instances, proposed amendments
incorporate quite specific possibly esoteric or artificial definitions. What
should ballot summaries disclose? The Florida Supreme Court has held
that at least some open-ended terms in proposed amendments left undefined must be identified as such in ballot summaries; proposed terms left
undefined but readily associated with straightforward or otherwise predictable legal definitions need not be stressed;2 34 summary terms that are
associated with insufficiently obvious legal definitions fail unless the
pertinence of the definitions is somehow noticed in ballot summaries. 3 5
Notice here is plainly not notice concerning the substance of a proposed

amendment (a voter is not well-positioned, in the moment immediately
233. City of Miami v. Staats, 919 So. 2d 485, 486 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 2005) illustrates one
variation. This case did not involve a proposed constitutional amendment, but rather a nonbinding
straw ballot question presented to voters as part of a special county-wide election: "Straw Ballot
Question No. 1 Shall the voters of Miami-Dade elect the Tax Assessor instead of the County
Manager of Miami-Dade County appointing the Tax Assessor?" Id. For present purposes, this
difference does not matter: Citing Armstrong v. Harrisand Askew v. Firestone, the Third District
Court of Appeal panel ruled the ballot question invalid. Id. at 487. Judge Fletcher emphasized that
the ballot language failed "to adequately inform the voting public that their response has no
official effect .... " Id. (Judge Fletcher also noted that the question did not clearly state that the
matter was not a city affair strictly but, if binding, would have required county-wide approval; in
addition, the ballot language erred in identifying the office it addressed. Id. Neither of these latter
difficulties would have mattered if it were plain that the results of the vote would be nonbinding.)
Uncertain voters would not be able to discern from the language of the presented question itselfphrased in manifestly decisive terms-that they were being asked to participate in an advisory
exercise. The ballot language thus confused (in this sense falsely communicated) its own claim to
a particular legal status (as a request for advice).
The phrase "straw ballot" itself, however, was included in the ballot language. Id. at 486.
Judge Fletcher had to have supposed-he did not discuss the matter-that "straw ballot"
insufficiently proclaimed voting results to be nonbinding, or that the emphatic cast of the ballot
language put in question, in this particular context, the usual meaning of the phrase. Even so, we
might wonder, if the straw ballot would have been regarded by city and county officials, as well as
courts, as only advisory (officials no doubt knew what a "straw ballot" was), what precisely was
the problem created by confused voters? The real damage done, it might be argued, was
interpretive. Officials-like voters-could not be sure as to what the results of the straw ballot
meant. Some voters might have voted negatively because they thought they were being asked to
change law and, even if they had an initial opinion, they were unwilling to act decisively. Others
might not have voted at all because the question appeared to be legally decisive and these voters
too were not ready to act (even if they held initial opinions). If so, Judge Fletcher was right
(within the terms of the argument I have developed) to invoke Armstrong and Askew.
234. See, e.g., In re Funding of Embryonic Stem Cell Research, 959 So. 2d 195, 201 (Fla.
2007); In re Referenda Required for Local Land Use Plans, 938 So. 2d 501, 504-06 (Fla. 2006);
In re Fla. Marriage Prot. Amendment, 926 So. 2d 1229, 1237 (Fla. 2006); In re Same Fee for
Same Health Care Serv., 880 So. 2d 659, 665 (Fla. 2004).
235. See, e.g., Fla. Minimum Wage, 880 So. 2d at 641-42; Health Hazards of Second-hand
Smoke, 814 So. 2d at 418-19; Treating People Differently, 778 So. 2d at 896-99; People's Prop.
Rights, 699 So. 2d at 1308-09.
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prior to voting, to consider closely the significance of a constitutional
text's gaps or intricacies-even assuming the text was at hand). Rather,
notice is notice of the potential significance of interpretation down the
road: the possibility that subsequent judicial or administrative readings
of proposed constitutional language might substantially shape a wouldbe amendment's legal impact. 23 6 At the same time, therefore, notice of
this possibility is tantamount to marking pertinent terms as rightly
understood as delegations, as primary topics for judicial or administrative elaboration and improvisation.2 3 7
b.

Buster revisited

Perhaps notably, within the perspective that I am sketching here the
ballot summary addressing the constitutional amendment scrutinized in
Florida Hospital Waterman, Inc. v. Buster2 38 appears problematic. The
summary asserted: "This amendment would give patients the right to
review, upon request, records of health care facilities' or providers'
adverse medical incidents, including those which could cause injury or
death. 23 9 Opponents argued that the summary overstated the change in
Florida law that the amendment might work because there were
"existing methods to obtain this information." 24 0 The Supreme Court
concluded-utterly persuasively-that an earlier sentence in the summary declaring that "Florida law 'restricts' information concerning
adverse medical incidents" was careful enough: "The amendment creates a broader right to know about adverse medical incidents than currently exists."2 4t
Amendment opponents, it appears, did not call attention to the
interplay of the proposed Florida constitutional language and United
States statutory directives.2 42 The federal Health Care Quality Improvement Act provides that "any person" associated with "professional
review action" by a "professional review body" (for example, a hospital
peer review board) "shall not be liable in damages under any law of the
236. See, e.g., In re Additional Homestead Tax Exemption, 880 So. 2d 646, 653 (Fla. 2004).
See also Fla. Hometown Democracy, Inc. v. Cobb, 953 So. 2d 666, 671-73 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct.
App. 2007) (failing to distinguish between amendments and revisions without practical

significance).
237. See, e.g., In re Med. Liab. Claimant's Comp. Amendment, 880 So. 2d 675, 679 (Fla.
2004) (obviously vague term "medical liability" undefined in summary was sufficient reference to
matters "better left to subsequent litigation").
238. 984 So. 2d 478, 482 (Fla. 2008).
239. In re Patients' Right to Know About Adverse Med. Incidents, 880 So. 2d 617, 619 (Fla.

2004).
240. Id. at 623.
241. Id.
242. See id. at 621-22.
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United States or of any State (or political subdivision thereof) with
respect to the action" if the review process was properly conducted as
statutorily defined.2 4 3 Congress, however, did not in so many words
privilege information generated by peer review investigations and the
like.2 44 In this respect, the federal act and the Florida constitutional
amendment are not in direct conflict.2 4 5
But Congress also explicitly declared:
Except as specifically provided in this subchapter, nothing in this
subchapter shall be construed as changing the liabilities or immunities under law or as preempting or overriding any State law which
provides incentives, immunities, or protection for those engaged in a
professional review action that is in addition to or greater than that
provided by this subchapter.24 6
This provision, while allowing states to provide "greater" immunities or
other "protection" for peer review processes, effectively encapsulates
the principal programmatic thrust of the federal statute: the statute's own
specifications of proper peer review procedures fix threshold conditions
determining whether information disclosed in the course of peer review
inquiry may become a basis for damages liability otherwise recognized
under either federal or state law. Thus, if records developed in peer
review proceedings disclose apparent facts suggestive of hospital or
physician negligence implicating not only the doctor or doctors who are
the immediate focus of peer review proceedings,2 47 but also "any" other
person, these disclosures might be said to be generated by "professional
review action" within the meaning of the Health Care Quality Improvement Act. Peer review and subsequent lawsuits might therefore be
understood to be tied sufficiently closely together to meet the Act's
"with respect to" test for damages immunity. 24 8 The federal statutory
immunity would therefore seemingly govern, even if Florida's own, evi243. 42 U.S.C. § 1111 l(a) (2006); 42 U.S.C. § 11112 (2006) (review procedure requirements).
Although questions as to the applicability of the Act's immunity often arise in suits brought by
physicians directly contesting hospital denial of staff privileges, other individuals or entities who
provide information to peer review panels and who are sued also may claim the immunity. See,
e.g., Singh v. Blue Cross/Blue Shield of Mass., Inc., 308 F.3d 25, 39 (1st Cir. 2002).
244. See § 11111(a); Imperial v. Suburban Hosp. Ass'n, 37 F.3d 1026, 1030-31 (4th Cir.
1994).
245. W. Ha. Reg'l Med. Ctr., Inc. v. See, 18 So. 3d 676, 685-86 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 2009).
246. 42 U.S.C. § 11115(a) (2006).
247. This possibility is considered at length and analyzed characteristically trenchantly by my
colleague Mary Coombs, in How Not to Do Medical Malpractice Reform: A Florida Case Study,
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373, 420-23 (2008).

248. Cf. Rowe v. N.H. Motor Transp. Assn'n, 552 U.S. 364, 372 (2008) (state law was "with
reference to" for statutory preemption purposes insofar as it "produces the very effect that the
federal law sought to avoid").
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dently narrower peer review immunity did not. 24 9
The ballot summary "right to review" characterization, set against
the backdrop of federal law as well as Florida law, now appears carefully drawn: "review" makes no claim regarding use and therefore
implicitly acknowledges the possibility that whatever is learned in the
process of "review" may have no practical value for litigation purposes,
for example. But this nuanced hedge is also in tension (putting it mildly)
with ordinary legal understandings of "right." "Right" implies-presumably-the possibility of legal action to give effect, to enforce, to act
legally in some meaningful way. It may well be, of course, that there are
efficacious modes of acting that remain available even if access to courts
through usual modes of suit are not. But given ordinary legal understandings, shouldn't the ballot summary have pointed in some clearer
way to the likely only limited modes of recourse that federal law might
leave individuals exercising their Florida constitutional "right to
250
review"? Armstrong v. Harris redux?
249. See FLA. STAT. §§ 766.101 (3) & (4) (2007); Columbia Hosp. Corp. of S. Broward v.
Fain, 16 So. 3d 236, 243 n.l ( Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 2009). Enforcement of general tort
obligations-for example, the duty of care-may fall within the scope of federal statutory
preemption even though, within their own terms, tort duties themselves do not single out and
specifically address matters as characterized in federal statutes-the key, it appears, is whether
common law duties respond-crucially, in substantively different ways-to the same general
concerns that prompt federal law. See, e.g., Riegel v. Medtronic, Inc., 522 U.S. 312, 321 (2008);
Bates v. Dow Agrosciences LLC, 544 U.S. 431,442-43 (2005); Cipollone v. Liggett Group, Inc.,
505 U.S. 504. 522-23 (1992) (plurality opinion).
250. Cases involving abuse of amendment submission procedures, I would argue, are not
Armstrong cases even if such cases involve conduct plausibly characterizable as efforts to deceive
election officials and voters. Amendment processes as such are ordinarily irrelevant to the task of
fitting amendment language within the larger constitutional and legal ensemble. If abuse of
process voids an amendment accurately presented to voters and other interpreters, some other
explanation must lie. Floridians Against Expanded Gambling v. Floridians for a Level Playing
Field, 945 So. 2d 553, 556 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 2006), presents a recent challenging case. The
allegation-treated as true for purposes of summary judgment-was that proponents of a
legalized gambling initiative (approved by voters) had acted fraudulently by claiming that
submitted petitions were in compliance with constitutional requirements. Id. at 557. The First
District Court of Appeal held that voter approval did not cure the fraud, were it ultimately proved
at trial. Id. at 561. The challenge to the petitions was brought before the election, but the Circuit
Court postponed ruling until after election day. Id. at 557. The court relied repeatedly on
Crawford v. Gilchrist's insistence that constitutional propositions are binding law. Id. at 560-61
(repeatedly quoting Crawford v. Gilchrist, 59 So. 963 (Fla. 1912)). See discussion supra Part II. B.
"[C]ompliance is mandatory." FloridiansAgainst Expanded Gambling, 945 So. 2d at 560. But
there were also recurring invocations of Armstrong v. Harris,773 So. 2d 7 (Fla. 2000)-sounding
the theme that proponents had, if allegations held up, worked "to fraudulently create the illusion"
of complying "with the mandatory constitutional prerequisites." FloridiansAgainst Expanded
Gambling, 945 So. 2d at 561. "[I]t is difficult to say how the voting public would have voted on
the amendment if the public knew it was placed on the ballot by the proponent's fraudulent
conduct." Id. at 561 n.6. Do we really suppose that voters are influenced (or should be) by the
assumption that a proposal satisfied the signatures requirement? Should voters defer-to some
extent-to proponents' wishes because enough people signed petitions? No one would suppose
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OVERLAPS

The ideas that I argue should be treated as shaping identification of
self-executing amendments and analysis of the content of ballot summaries are not entirely distinct - in this respect themselves evidence the
complexity implicit in Florida constitutional understandings. We catch
glimpses in decisions of the Florida Supreme Court reviewing legislation regulating initiative procedures.
Smith v. Coalition to Reduce Class Size25 ' addressed an effort of
the Florida Legislature to introduce into the initiative process a require-

ment that the then-Secretary of State prepare a financial impact analysis
of all initiative-proposed constitutional amendments, and place a fifty
word summary on the ballot along with the ballot distillation of the text
of the proposed amendment.2 5 2 The legislature also voted to put the
same requirement on the next election ballot as a proposed constitutional
amendment.2 53 The issue in Smith, raised and decided before the election
(at which voters approved the constitutional amendment 25 4 ), was
whether the Legislature was constitutionally empowered to enact the

statutory version of the financial impact analysis requirement.2 5 5 Writing
for a majority of the court, Justice Harding thought not. Nothing in the
language of article XI, section 3, addressed or presupposed financial
impact statements.2 56 Article XI, section 3, is "a self-executing constituthat the proposed amendment, once adopted, would implicitly repeal the signature requirements,
replacing them with some "plausible misrepresentation" substitute. If that were the effect, of
course, Armstrong's concerns (as characterized here) would be precisely pertinent. Disclosure of
petition processes should have been made. (Arguably, the single subject question might also
loom.) Perhaps the First District was not willing to rest its decision solely on Crawford because,
as Chief Justice Whitfield also acknowledged in Crawford, "mandatory constitutional
prerequisites" encompassed only those constitutional specifications deemed to be "essential
mandatory provisions" or "vital elements." FloridiansAgainst Expanded Gambling, 945 So. 2d. at
560 (quoting Crawford,59 So. at 966-68). Invoking Armstrong and the voter perspective, it might
have seemed, provided a way of distinguishing what was "essential" or "vital" from what was not.
But if the Armstrong concerns are not actually apt, what then? Of course, if the question of voter
deception derives from the mismatch of ballot summary language and the substance of the
proposed constitutional amendment, Armstrong is plainly pertinent, even if the substance of a
proposed amendment was process. In re Nonpartisan Commission to Apportion Legislative
Districts., 926 So. 2d 1218, 1228 (Fla. 2006), concerned a summary that declared that the proposal
established a "non-partisan method of appointment" for selecting members of the apportionment
commission set up by the amendment. Id. Looking at the actual wording of the amendment,
however, the Supreme Court concluded that "[wjhile the commission itself may operate in an
independent, nonpartisan fashion, the method of selecting the commission members is decidedly
partisan." Id. at 1228-29. The summary was thus invalid. Id. at 1229.
251. 827 So. 2d 959 (Fla. 2002).
252. Id. at 960.
253. Id.
254. See FLA. CoNsT. art. I, § 17.
255. Smith, 827 So. 2d at 961.
256. Id. at 963.
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tional provision. 25 7 Including a financial impact analysis in ballot lan2 5 8 The statutory
guage was not "necessary to ensure ballot integrity.
259
provision for impact analysis was unconstitutional.
Justice Harding quoted at length from State ex rel. Citizens Proposition for Tax Relief v. Firestone.6 ° In this 1980 opinion, Justice
Overton emphasized the "delicate symmetric balance" implicit in the
constitutional provision for both legislative and initiative proposed
amendments. 26 ' "[A]ny restriction on the initiative process would
strengthen the authority and power of the legislature and weaken the
power of the initiative process. '"262 As a result, legislative regulation of
initiative processes was proper only in connection with preservation of
ballot integrity. 263 "Ballot integrity is necessary to ensure the effectiveness of the constitutionally provided initiative process," and thus would
not "weaken ...the initiative process. ' '2 6 Overton's Tax Relief opinion
did not draw Harding's distinction between constitutional provisions
that are or are not "self-executing." Did Harding and Overton disagree in
any fundamental way? Reading article XI, section 3, Justice Harding
was plainly invoking the idea of "sufficiency," indeed a version evocative of a very strong model of straightforward organization-the amendment itself supplied all that was pertinent, in this sense possessed an
"integrity" that the Florida Legislature was required to respect. Justice
Overton's insistence that ballot integrity must be the touchstone in judging legislative additions is plainly of a piece.
It may be argued, however, that Harding and Overton, focusing
closely on article XI, section 3, pushed substance-the content of
would-be amendments-too far to the margin. These proposals, of
course, would add to the Florida Constitution their own emphases,
marked initially in ballot summaries or subsequently in interpretive
glosses. In particular, therefore, the question of financial costs and benefits might seem pertinent to voters gauging whether to support added
commitments and also to other, later interpreters judging the extent and
implications of constitutional emphases. Article XI, section 3 ought not
to be read in isolation, we may think-but read complexly, acknowledging the substance of proposed amendments and their possible
257. Id. at 962.
258. Id. at 963.

259. Id. at 964.
260. 386 So. 2d 561 (Fla. 1980).

261. Id. at 566.
262. Id.

263. Id. at 567.
264. Id. at 566-67.
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implications.2 6 5
The Supreme Court's recent decision in Browning v. Florida
Hometown Democracy, Inc., PA C2 66 revisited the question of legislative
power to regulate initiative processes. This time, the issue presented to
the court had to do with the constitutionality of statutory attempts to
establish procedures addressing efforts by Florida citizens to revoke

(withdraw or in effect remove) their signatures from initiative petitions.
The accumulation of a sufficient number of signatures is a necessary

step in moving a proposed constitutional amendment onto the ballot for
voter consideration. Initially anyway, it is easy to understand the ques-

tion of signature revocation to be a matter arising quite routinely in the
course of initiative efforts, and therefore closely-tied-indeed, integral-to the constitutional scheme of initiative amendment. The Florida
Supreme Court nonetheless ruled that the statutory effort was invalid.
The legislation allowed political action committees to draft, dis-

tribute, market, and submit signature-revocation forms-to in effect
mount signature-revocation campaigns. Moreover, under the law, revo-

cation was irrevocable-a Florida citizen could not legally change her or

265. In re Extending Existing Sales Tax, 953 So. 2d 471 (Fla. 2000), shows how conclusions
about self-executing provisions become-sometimes complicatedly-part of the legal background
pertinent in ballot summary assessment. Two proposals defining procedures to be used in
considering whether to include various services within the reach of the state sales tax, held up too
long in the early stages of the initiative process, incorporated July 2008 deadlines for legislative
action that fell in advance of the November election at which voters would consider the proposals.
Id. at 488. As a result, if voters approved the proposals, the amendments-if implemented
literally-would subject most services to tax. Id. at 484. The ballot summaries, otherwise judged
to be accurate, did not acknowledge this result. Id. at 485. The Florida Supreme Court held that
the summaries were defective. Id. at 492. In 1995, however, the Court had approved another
proposal, authorizing casino gambling, that set a July 1995 deadline for legislative action, also
impossible to meet since the proposal would not come before voters until November 1996. In re
Fla. Locally Approved Gaming ("FLAG Initiative"), 656 So. 2d 1259, 1263-64 (Fla. 1995).
Justice Amstead, writing for the Sales Tax majority, stressed what he took to be a clear distinction:
"[I]n FLAG Initiative[,] legislative regulation was clearly contemplated as a predicate to the
amendment becoming operable, whereas, in this case, the critical part of the amendment is selfexecuting." Extending Existing Sales Tax, 953 So. 2d at 484. It is not clear, though, that the
Florida Supreme Court fully worked out the implications of the self-executing notion in this
context. The proposals did not, by their terms, take effect (if passed) until January 1, 2009. See id.
There was therefore a window within which the Florida Legislature could undertake the review
that the proposals contemplated, even if it was literally too late. Would late review-say, in
November or December rather than the pre-July review that the amendment supposed-be barred
by the adopted proposals? Exercise of legislative judgment was plainly one main point of the
proposals. We might reasonably conclude that the new tax procedures would not have been selfexecuting (in the strongest sense, anyway) until 2009. The pertinent question for ballot language
would then become-should the summaries have noted the need for quick legislative action? The
summaries, though, already did that in effect by calling attention to the January 1, 2009 deadline.
See id. at 484-85.
266. No. SC08-884, 2010 WL 546768 (Fla. Feb. 18, 2010).

20101

COMPLEXITY AND CONTRADICTION

his mind a second time and again sign a second petition proposing a
given amendment.
These signature-revocation campaigns are inherently designed to vitiate the effectiveness of the petition-circulation process because those
entities conducting revocation campaigns may submit their gathered
revocation forms as late as February 1 . . . , which is the same date
on which the Secretary of State must verify whether the initiative
proponents have gathered enough signatures .... Hence, initiative
proponents will likely receive no notice with regard to how many of
their gathered, signed petition forms have been revoked until it is too
late to gather, submit, and verify additional signatures. In operation,
this timing requirement would erase the citizen-initiative process
267
from article XI ..
In a targeted fashion, these campaigns seek to change elector-signatories' minds . . . before any ensuing amendment referendum and
accompanying public discourse occur .... Rather than curbing any
alleged fraudulent practices present in the petition-circulation process, these provisions incentivize a race to the bottom .... Once an
elector has signed but later revoked his or her signature, he or she
may NEVER again sign the relevant initiative petition and, in a parallel fashion, initiative proponents are forever prohibited from
obtaining this elector's support to place the initiative proposal on the
ballot for the next general election. . . . The restrictions that the
instant provisions place on the petition-circulation process substantially reduce the size of the audience that the sponsor can reach, and
render it less likely that the sponsor can gamer the requisite number
of signatures .... 268
But why shouldn't the court have deferred to the legislative judgment that signature revocation procedures were needed to protect against
fraudulent signature submissions by initiative proponents and that
signatures
authorizing PAC efforts to seek out citizens wishing to2 revoke
69
was an efficient means of protecting ballot integrity?
[A]rticle XI, section 3, is a "self-executing" constitutional provision,
which was adopted to bypass legislative and executive control and to
provide the people of Florida a narrow but direct voice in amending
their fundamental organic law .... As a result, article XI, section 3
provides an additional check and balance against legislative and
executive power, which is not present at the federal level .... Hence,
... [the] assertion that the Legislature and the executive branch possess broad power to regulate the initiative process, subject in all cases
to deferential review, is in direct conflict with the very nature of the
267. Id. at *4.

268. Id. at *4-5.
269. See id. at *16 (Polston, J., dissenting).
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conferred fundamental right, which acts as a check on such power. 27°
Close judicial scrutiny therefore followed:
On one hand, constitutional provisions are presumed self-executing
to prevent the Legislature from nullifying the will of the people as
expressed in their Constitution.... On the other hand, the Legislature
may provide additional laws addressing a self-executing constitutional scheme assuming that such laws supplement, protect, or further
the availability of the constitutionally conferred right, but the Legislature may not modify the right in such a fashion that it alters or frustrates the intent of the framers and the people.2 7'
Justice Harding's assertion in Smith that the self-executing status of
a constitutional provision mattered in considering legislative authority
thus returns with a vengeance! In Hometown Democracy, "self-execution" defines the relationship of a given constitutional provision vis-Avis others-in this instance ordinary acknowledgements of legislative
and executive responsibility and thereby also fixes the appropriate judicial perspective. "Self-execution" becomes, in the process, a means of
mapping constitutional complexity, a means of assigning priority to one
provision and its commitments even while also acknowledging and fixing the pertinence of others. We can see also that this way of putting
matters is a close cousin to the idea of "canonical indexing" that I have
argued lies in the background in the ballot summary cases like Armstrong v. Harris.A provision, once identified as self-executing, becomes
the key to grouping and differentiating, to ordering relationships across a
range of now-understood as related constitutional provisions. And therefore, as the Hometown Democracy majority opinion made clear, whether
a given provision is understandable as self-executing turns on whether it
is possible for the provision to perform this indexing-whether in substance the provision includes enough working material to describe (to
index) the larger constitutional relationships. "Congress passed the Act
'to improve the quality of medical care by encouraging physicians to
identify and discipline physicians who are incompetent or who engage in
unprofessional behavior.' ,272
V.

PREMISES

Constitutional complexity and associated notions work as premises-preoccupations or starting points that help orient and shape analy270. Id. at *6.
271. Id. at *7.
272. Mathews v. Lancaster Gen. Hosp., 87 F.3d 624, 632 (3d. Cir. 1996) (quoting H.R. Rep.
No. 99-903, at 2 (1986)).
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sis. It is important, therefore, to acknowledge the suppositions that these
premises themselves carry.
A.

Associating Voters, Judges, Administrators, and Legislators

I make heavy use of an equation of voters, judges, executive officials, and legislators. Only if these several actors may be understood as
participating in some relevant way (even if at different stages) in something like the same project-reacting to constitutional amendments-is
it possible to underscore as central the distinctive problems of interpretation posed by constitutional conjunctions, terms in some sense playing
off (or against or with) each other. The Florida Supreme Court's efforts,
I argue, are best approached from this hermeneutic perspective. But why
should we suppose that voters and judges, for example, are in some
important sense involved in the same enterprise when they read and try
to come to grips with constitutional provisions? Their tasks are plainly
different, and often so too (we may think) their approaches. Professor
Schacter elaborated on this theme emphatically and persuasively in her
well-known study:
A central point suggested by this study is a radical rupture between
two conceptions of law. Law, on the one hand, is seen by the courts
[T]he law principally
...in highly positivist, material terms ....
consists of the statutory text and what is reflected in other formal
legal sources .... The farthest this conception extends is to include
ballot material, which is mandated by and prepared in accordance
with state law, reduced to an identifiable text, and reminiscent of
traditional legislative history.
Contrast a second, popularconception of law-law as it is seen from
the perspective of the voters in an initiative campaign.... The words
of the law are but a starting point for the larger, more complex, and
sprawling social process of generating legal meanings. In the context
of initiative laws, the mass media form a central, indeed constitutive,
part of this larger organization and production of meaning.27 3
The assumption that voters and judges are quintessentially different
is also difficult, however. Voters may vary a great deal in their methods
of assessment and the measure of sophistication they actually bring to
assessing and voting on amendment proposals. Should judges, confronting constitutional provisions that their own training and experience
mark as complex, nonetheless read straightforwardly, on the assumption
that that is the way they think that most voters read-or the way, at
273. Schacter, supra note 69, at 147-48; see id. at 131-38 (summarizing research on mass
media influence). Schacter studied initiatives having the effect of statutes-not constitutional
amendments. But this slightly different focus is immaterial for present purposes.
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least, that the median voter reads?2 7 4 Should judges instead expand the
range of materials they consider to encompass mass media depictions
and the like in order to reconstruct the voter environment?27 5 Or should
judges suppose that voters by and large suppose that judges will read

constitutional amendments the way judges ordinarily read legal documents-sometimes complexly, therefore-even if voters do not read this
way? Constitutional provisions come to the attention of judges within

contexts identified-constitutionally-as proper occasions for judges to
bring to bear the distinctive resources of legal instruments and
processes. If constitutional provisions are "law" in the ordinary sense (as

we so often declare), and if the capacity for complexity is an ordinary
attribute of legal instruments, judges might be thought to be acting

outside their office if they denied to themselves, in matters of constitutional construction, access to usual interpretive possibilities.
Jane Schacter is right. Voters and judges will likely sometimes
(often?) understand constitutional language in different ways. But "this
culture clash" may not be "problematic" 2 7 6-or rather, it may not be
problematically problematic. The possibility that popular and legal
understandings diverge, I would argue, is a pointed challenge to drafters
of amendment proposals and ballot language-a spur to trying to square
popular norms and legal interplays, to acknowledging therefore both the
felt necessities of the given moment and also the persisting institutional
workings within which any particular constitutional proposal will have
its effects.27 7 Judges and other lawyerly interpreters, of course, feel the

same spur in constructing their own understandings of what amendments
274. It is possible to argue, of course, that judges should always interpret all constitutional
provisions-and not just particular amendments-by attempting to adopt the perspective implicit
in common understandings. Robert Williams has argued that this is in fact the distinctive
methodological supposition of state constitutional law. See Robert F. Williams, The Brennan
Lecture: InterpretingState Constitutions as Unique Legal Documents, 27 OKLA. CITY U. L. REV.
189, 194-97 (2002). Even setting aside problems posed by clear constitutional uses of terms of art
and more oblique allusions to other bodies of law, it is hard to ignore the impact of repeated
intense attention to constitutional terms, and the differing emphases that emerge, even if "ordinary
language" is in some sense (as it surely is) the principal communicative medium-some
differentiation in usage, the emergence of something like a distinctive genre, is hardly surprising.
275. For a sense of the difficulties involved in this approach, see Staszewski, supra note 7, at
46-47.
276. Schacter, supra note 69, at 149.
277. This twinned structure (or something much like it) is outlined at greater length and put to
work in two remarkable articles, works of my colleague Bill Blatt. William S. Blatt, Minority
Discounts, FairMarket Value, and the Culture of Estate Taxation, 52 TAx L. REV. 225 (1997);
William Blatt, The American Dream in Legislation: The Role of Popular Symbols in Wealth Tax
Policy, 51 TAX L. REv. 287 (1996). There may be circumstances, of course, in which this
compound perspective is not pertinent, within which constitutional law and judicial interpreters
must choose, for example, between acknowledging the independent significance of extraconstitutional acts and asserting the ordinary requirements of law. But the drafting, proposing, and
judicial review of constitutional amendments would not ordinarily seem to be such occasions. The
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accomplish. The three limits that the Florida Supreme Court has repeatedly taken seriously in considering amendments and amendment proposals, we can see, hold drafters-and at the same time the Justices
themselves-to this task in different ways. 278 The inquiry into whether
amendments are self-executing rewards drafting that displays "due
regard"-sufficiently recognizes the complexities created by competing
interests. Ballot summary accuracy requirements insist that drafters
include-mark as pertinent-all legally significant changes amendments
would make, and not just those evocative of perhaps too-immediate or
too-general public concerns. With regard to these matters, it appears,
judges who draw upon their ordinary legal competencies in responding
to proposal language and ballot summaries are simply playing their part
in organizing and maintaining the requisite common constitutive
tension. 79
B.

Institutional or Formal Complexity?

Much of the on-going debate about direct democracy begins with a
comparison of initiatives and the like and legislatures. The underlying
question concerns either the degree to which direct democracy is actually "democratic," or whether the absence of "republican" filtering
mechanisms built into representative institutions (paradigmatically legislatures) marks initiatives etcetera as troubling even if they are in some
sense democratic. 28 0 But these inquiries raise questions themselves. As
deployed, ideas of "democracy"-more precisely, specifications of the
democratic deficiencies of direct democracy-are often strikingly thoroughgoing, treating constitutional initiatives and the like as properly
subject to suspicion in gross. 28 ' Elaborations of "republican" aspects of
Fourteenth Amendment of the United States Constitution may supply a counter-example. See 2
BRUCE ACKERMAN, WE THE PEOPLE: TRANSFORMATIONS 99-119 (1998).
278. The single subject demand penalizes efforts to draft amendments in ways that would
purport to treat the amendments as though they were narrow responses to discrete problems if in
fact the amendments might well have large effects vis-A-vis the overall constitutional structure.
See Appendix infra.
279. The pertinence of ordinary expectations regarding the form and content of legal
instruments is especially apparent in Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620 (1996), in which the United
States Supreme Court ruled that a Colorado initiative-proposed amendment was inconsistent with
the Fourteenth Amendment Equal Protection Clause because the amendment, as drafted, imposed

"a broad and undifferentiated disability on a single named group, [in this case, homosexual

individuals] . . . unprecedented in our jurisprudence." Id. at 632-33. "[I]ts sheer breadth is so
discontinuous with the reasons offered for it that the amendment seems inexplicable by anything
but animus toward the class it affects ... ." Id. at 632. "It is not within our constitutional tradition
to enact laws of this sort." Id. at 633.
280. For thorough-going efforts to work within both perspectives, see Staszewski, supra note
7, at 39-59; Glen Staszewski, Rejecting the Myth of PopularSovereignty andApplying an Agency
Model to Direct Democracy, 56 VAND. L. REv. 395, 401-11 (2003).
281. For an over-arching, historically-framed development of this line of thinking, see Harry

UNIVERSITY OF MIAMI LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 64:879

legislative action proceed similarly.28 2 To be sure, it is not impossible
that legislative processes, carefully characterized, might sometimes provide a reference point for assessing initiatives and the like. For example,
Philip Frickey's work in this vein highlights and evaluates, with notable
sophistication, features present or absent in the content of particular proposals.28 3 The democratic starting point is also sometimes developed in
similarly fine-grained ways. 284 But as Frickey acknowledges-and as
Elizabeth Garrett has demonstrated at length 28 5 -it is simply an inescapable fact that the overall constitutional regime, in many states, is
mixed or "hybrid," includes both modes of direction democracy and representative institutions as constituent elements.28 6 Approaches that
develop models and criteria mostly by focusing on one or the other of
the compounded elements appear to be always worrisomely incomplete,
perhaps biased from the outset, and thus burdened as well as prompted
by their own starting points.
What would "hybrid theory" look like? Professor Garrett's work
stresses the interaction and sometimes complementarity of processes of
direct democracy and institutions of representative government, considering ways in which, for example, officeholders or candidates use initiative efforts as adjuncts to their personal election efforts, at times thereby
facilitating voter evaluation of candidates, but in other instances confusing or otherwise degrading the electoral environment. 8 7 In an especially
ambitious effort, she joins with Mathew McCubbins to outline in considerable detail an initiative scheme that takes legislative process as its governing analogy, at one stage indeed literally incorporates legislative
involvement, and at several points includes administrative oversight and

N. Scheiber, Foreword: The Direct Ballot and State Constitutionalism, 28 RUTGERS L.J. 787
(1997). An especially ambitious analytical argument for representative democracy vis-A-vis direct
democracy is another important illustration. Clark, supra note 7. See also Richard B. Collins, How
Democratic Are Initiatives?, 72 U. CoLo. L. REV. 983 (2001).
282. The republican case for across-the-board skepticism is made emphatically in Professor
Eule's now-classic article. Julian N. Eule, Judicial Review of Direct Democracy, 99 YALE L.J.
1503, 1548-51, 1558 (1990). For a more recent discussion, exploring institutional alternatives to
judicial review as the principle republican protection, see Ethan J. Leib, Can Direct Democracy
Be Made Deliberative?, 54 BUFF. L. REv. 903, 914-24 (2006).
283. See Frickey, supra note 161, at 510-26.
284. E.g., Elizabeth Garrett, The Promise and Perils of Hybrid Democracy, 59 OKLA. L. REV.
227 (2006); Elizabeth Garrett, Commentary, Crypto-Initiatives in Hybrid Democracy, 78 S. CAL.
L. REV. 985 (2005).
285. Elizabeth Garrett, Hybrid Democracy, 73 GEO. WASH. L. REv. 1096 (2005).
286. "[D]irect democracy is a part of government that affects the majority of Americans.
Seventy-one percent of Americans live in a state or city (or both) that allows the popular
initiative." Id. at 1096.
287. See Garrett, Promise and Perils,supra note 284.
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enforcement. 288 This combination of modalities means to make possible
an initial specification of policy parameters, subsequent disciplined elaboration, refinement and reconsideration of the content of initiative proposals, and ultimately effective implementation of initiative terms in the
wake of affirmative popular vote.
But tdtonnement exercises of this sort, it seems clear, suppose background models of fair elections or good legislative or administrative
order. In combination, these models may to some degree war with each
other. 289 But even considered separately, they may prove controversial.
For example Dennis Thompson has sketched an account of fair election
campaigns, in the process proposing a striking irrelevance theorem:
We should not design campaigns to disrupt the more stable, longterm views that most voters hold before the campaign starts (which
they may not be able to articulate but which their predicted voting
behavior expresses). To the extent that campaigns help all voters
(including the late deciders) bring their decision on election day into
line with their long-term views, they are serving a desirable democratic function. Campaigns are more likely to perform this function to
the extent that they are balanced and focused on fundamentals. 290
This is a plainly controversial assertion. At least sometimes, we might
want to think, campaigns work and should work (intentionally or otherwise) precisely to put in question "stable, long-term views." If so, destabilizing maneuvers are therefore sometimes precisely the point.
Exercises in direct democracy indeed possess this unsettling potential. "Direct democracy is by its nature a discontinuous, non-institutional, non-interactive lawmaking event .... 291 If we accept these last
propositions, we might reasonably doubt the overarching applicability of
Thompson's premise and its corollary norm of "balanced and focused,"
forthrightly epiphenomenal campaigns.
In this article, I have sidestepped questions of legislative, administrative, and election norms. Instead of beginning with institutions, their
core characteristics, and their interactions, I emphasize constitutions and
amendments as documentary concatenations, the range of their substantive interplays, and the problems for interpreters that formal irresolution
288. Elizabeth Garrett & Mathew D. McCubbins, The Dual Path Initiative Framework, 80 S.
299 (2007).
289. See, e.g., Edward L. Rubin, Getting Past Democracy, 149 U. PA. L. REv. 711, 713-14
(2001):"[T]he term 'democracy' irretrievably incorporates premodern conceptions of government
that do not reflect our genuine political commitments. It is the administrative state, and not the
concept of democracy, that embodies these commitments." Id. Rubin briefly discusses initiative
elections. See id. at 761-62.
290. Dennis F. Thompson, Two Concepts of Corruption: Making Campaigns Safe for
Democracy, 73 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1036, 1053 (2005).
291. Frickey, supra note 161, at 508.
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presents. Institutional arrangements matter, of course. But attention to
interpretive challenges-at least in the Florida context, I think-highlights opportunities the Florida Supreme Court's work and the Florida
Constitution itself suggest that might not otherwise be apparent. Just like
institutional explorations, though, the tack I take implies background
commitments. Principally, I associate problems (or resolutions) of constitutional meaning with complexity as it manifests itself in constitutional provisions. Complexity is not merely noise or static, a by-product
of drafting accidents or political processes without meaningful content.
Concurrences or tensions, conjunctions or overlaps or gaps, other sorts
of formal wrinkles: these ought to be, often enough, plausible indicators
of constitutional substance. Such juxtaposition effects, it might be said,
are justified or refuted by results-the readings they motivate in and of
themselves. Textual conjunctions, however, are not only- not necessarily points of origin as such for constitutional substance. Instead of
focusing on interactions themselves, in their various forms, we might
notice first the several constitutional provisions that are brought
together. It is their separate contents set in relationship with each other
that pose problems of reading; it is the arrived-at arrangement of the
several provisions that frames-that constitutionalizes-the substantive
interpretation that is ultimately put forward.
APPENDIX

On its face, the article XI, section 3 single subject requirement limiting initiative-proposed constitutional amendments appears-rather
plainly-to evoke (indeed exemplify) the constitutional model of
straightforward organization.2 92 Read as a group, however, the decisions
of the Florida Supreme Court enforcing this provision, I think, in fact
point to a preoccupation evocative of constitutional complexity.
The initiative single subject requirement may be understood-the
Florida Supreme Court has suggested-as responding to a deficiency in
the initiative drafting process. "[T]he single-subject limitation exists
because the citizen initiative process does not afford the same opportunity for public hearing and debate that accompanies the other constitutional proposal and drafting processes (i.e., constitutional amendments
proposed by the Legislature, by a constitutional revision commission, or
by a constitutional convention.)" '93 In the cases that come before it,
however, the Supreme Court frequently invokes two tests that put into
question its own explanation. Legislatively-proposed amendments-like
292. See discussion supra page 905.
293. In re Nonpartisan Comm'n to Apportion Legislative Dists, 926 So. 2d 1218, 1224 (Fla.
2006).
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initiative-proposed amendments-might group more or less independent
propositions appealing to different voting blocs (so-called "logrolling")-but logrolling dooms only initiative-proposed amendments. So
too, legislatively-proposed amendments-again like initiative-proposed
amendments-may redefine the responsibilities of more than one branch
of state government-and again only the initiative proposal therefore
fails.294 What is it about legislative deliberative processes that makes the
difference? From a voter perspective, it would seem, legislative and initiative amendments present the same challenges.
Setting aside their recited formulas, Florida Supreme Court decisions, considered in the aggregate, suggest that the initiative proposals
that are especially vulnerable are often proposals that are manifestly
constitutionally underinclusive-not conflicted on their own terms, but
seemingly leaving intact obviously inconsistent existing constitutional
provisions.2 95 Shortfalls of this sort arbitrarily abbreviate proposals that
would otherwise present voters with opportunities to consider the merits
of substantial constitutional change. Constitutionally underinclusive proposals, we can also see, may not just complicate further the complex
organization of the larger aggregate of constitutional indexes. Juxtaposition of an underinclusive proposal and unamended existing provisions,
suggestive of opposing themes, might inject new divergences communicating unpredictably-perhaps chaotically-across understandings of
still other constitutional provisions insofar as the proposal or its counters
figure in formulations of indexes characterizing those provisions as well.
Within these terms, the initiative single subject constraint enforces substantive focus and regulates jumbling of constitutional indices. It works
as "a rule of restraint designed to insulate Florida's organic law from
precipitous and cataclysmic change." '9 6 Single subject review, it would
seem, starts from pretty much the same worry that Justice Drew
expressed in Adams v. Gunter in interpreting the predecessor constitutionai limit-now revised to eliminate the temptation to textual game
playing that the predecessor had invited.
Why, then, is there no single subject restriction governing legislature-drafted proposed amendments? Both initiative and legislative
amendments should take into account pertinent constitutional complexity. We might think that legislative processes ought to be ordinarily well
set up to do so, given their ordinary tendency to compromise and qualify. But under-elaborated amendments may occur in both legislative and
294. See, e.g., id. at 1224-26; In re High Speed Monorail, 769 So. 2d 367, 369 (Fla. 2000).
295. For an especially clear use of this analysis, see In re Treating People Differently Based on
Race, 778 So. 2d 888, 894-95 (Fla. 2000). See also Gudridge, supra note 2, at 899-901.
296. In re Save Our Everglades, 636 So. 2d 1336, 1339 (Fla. 1994).
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initiative drafting processes because simplification appears to be a pragmatic tactic in electoral processes. The same pragmatism, it appears,
might counsel drafting of constitutional amendments in ways that substantially understate their constitutional ambition. This is, arguably, less
a problem in the legislative setting as such, which resists large-scale
revision (we may think) most of the time. But this very tendency suggests the potential usefulness of an alternative process more open to
ambition. We might understand initiative proposal to be that process
(taking Governor Askew's "Ethics in Government" campaign as paradigm). Enforcement of the single subject requirement works to require
articulation of constitutional ambition-embraced complexity.297

297. See Gudridge, supra note 2, at 899-901.

